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Within the theoretical framework of agenda setting, this dissertation used granger 
causality analysis to examine the relationships between news agendas of the media 
outlets and opinion leaders on one Chinese social network platform—Weibo. It also 
utilized network analysis to compare agenda-setting effects between the media outlets 
and opinion leaders in crisis and non-crisis news. The study not only applied agenda 
setting to Chinese social media, but it also approached the agenda-setting effects of social 
media from a completely different perspective, recognizing and differentiating the 
segmented agendas on social media platforms. It examined more nuanced agenda-setting 
effects among the most influential groups on social media platforms, determining and 
comparing the news agendas of these groups. The results showed agenda-setting effects 
exist only between the opinion leaders and commercial media outlets rather than the 
official media in China. Although journalists and celebrities tended to be the most 
influential ones on Twitter, business elites were the most influential opinion leader on 
Weibo. Furthermore, the agenda-setting process among these opinion leaders changed in 
crisis and non-crisis news. 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................x 
Chapter One: Introduction .......................................................................................1 
Significance of Research.................................................................................6 
Chapter Two: Agenda-Setting Theory ...................................................................10 
The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Theory .....................................................10 
Intermedia Agenda Setting ...........................................................................12 
Chapter Three: Chinese Social Media and Agenda Setting ...................................18 
The Rise of Social Media in China ...............................................................22 
The Characteristics of Chinese Social Media ...............................................25 
Opinion Leaders on Chinese Social Media ...................................................29 
Gender differences of opinion leaders on Weibo ................................34 
Traditional media and opinion leaders on Weibo ................................38 
Intermedia Agenda-Setting on Chinese Social Media ..................................41 
Agenda Setting in Crisis vs. Non-Crisis News on Weibo ............................44 
Chapter Four: Methodology ...................................................................................47 
The Intermedia Agenda-Setting Study..........................................................49 
The media agendas ...............................................................................49 
The agendas of opinion leaders ............................................................50 
Data collection .....................................................................................52 
Content analysis ...................................................................................53 
Granger causality analysis ...................................................................55 
The Comparative Agenda-Setting Study ......................................................57 
The Tianjin explosion ..........................................................................57 
Tu Youyou’s case ................................................................................58 
Data Collection ....................................................................................59 
Content analysis ...................................................................................60 
 viii 
Network analysis ..................................................................................62 
Chapter Five: Results of the Intermedia Agenda-Setting Study ............................64 
Issue Agendas of Opinion Leaders on Weibo...............................................64 
Correlations of the Opinion Leaders’ Agendas on Weibo ............................67 
Gender Differences of Opinion Leaders on Weibo ......................................68 
Differences between the Media Agendas on Weibo .....................................71 
Correlations between Issue Agendas of the Media and Opinion leaders on 
Weibo ...................................................................................................72 
Agenda Setting between the Media and Opinion leaders on Weibo ............73 
Conclusion of the Intermedia Agenda-Setting Study ...................................77 
Chapter Six: Results of the Comparative Agenda-Setting Study ..........................84 
The Agenda-Setting Effects in Crisis News .................................................84 
The Agenda-Setting Effects in Non-Crisis News .........................................94 
Conclusion of the Comparative Agenda-Setting Study ..............................102 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion ..................................................................................107 
Summary of Major Findings .......................................................................108 
Limitations and Suggestions .......................................................................113 
Appendix A: List of Selected Weibo Users .........................................................115 
Introduction to Official Media Outlets .......................................................116 
Introduction to Commercial Media Outlets ................................................117 
Appendix B: Coding Instruction for the First Study ............................................119 
Appendix C: Coding Instruction for the Second Study .......................................122 
References ............................................................................................................125 
 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Percentages and Rankings of the Issues of the Opinion Leaders ............65 
Table 2. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Agendas of the Opinion Leaders ...68 
Table 3. Percentages and Rankings of the Issues of Male/Female Opinion Leaders 
and the Media ....................................................................................70 
Table 4. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Issues of Male/Female Opinion Leaders 
and the Media ....................................................................................71 
Table 5. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Agendas of the Media and Opinion 
Leaders ..............................................................................................73 
Table 6. Granger Causality Results for the Media and Opinion Leaders ..............74 
Table 7. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Official and 
Commercial Media in the Tianjin Explosion ....................................85 
Table 8. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Opinion Leaders in 
the Tianjin Explosion ........................................................................89 
Table 9. QAP Correlations between the Networked Agendas of the Media and 
Opinion leaders in the Tianjin Explosion .........................................93 
Table 10. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Official and 
Commercial Media in Tu Youyou’s Case ........................................95 
Table 11. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Attribute Agendas of Opinion Leaders in Tu 
Youyou’s Case ..................................................................................98 
Table 12. QAP Correlations between the Networked Agendas of the Media and 
Opinion leaders in Tu Youyou’s Case ............................................102 
 x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Official Media Network in the Tianjin Explosion ..................................87 
Figure 2. Commercial Media Network in the Tianjin Explosion ..........................87 
Figure 3. Media Professionals’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion .......................90 
Figure 4. Celebrities’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion .......................................90 
Figure 5. Scholars’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion ..........................................92 
Figure 6. Business Elites’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion ................................92 
Figure 7. Official Media Network in Tu Youyou’s Case ......................................97 
Figure 8. Commercial Media Network in Tu Youyou’s Case ...............................97 
Figure 9. Media Professionals’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case ............................99 
Figure 10. Celebrities’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case .......................................100 
Figure 11. Scholars’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case ...........................................100 
Figure 12. Business Elites’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case ................................101 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The development of Internet communication technologies contributes to an 
abundance of online media channels and a blurring boundary between public and private 
domains. The ever-growing array of online news sources and their increasing popularity 
among the public have prompted communication scholars to reexamine the traditional 
media's agenda-setting roles. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to the agenda-
setting effects between traditional media and social media, especially Twitter (Cho & 
Shin, 2014; Hu et al., 2012; Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015; Groshek & Groshek, 2013; 
Kongthon, Haruechaiyasak, Pailai, & Kongyoung, 2012; Kushin, 2010; Kwak, Park, & 
Moon, 2010; Skogerbø & Krumsvik, 2015). However, the majority of previous agenda-
setting studies on social media focus on Twitter in the United States. Despite the 
popularity of social media around the globe, other kinds of social media and social media 
in countries besides the United States have received much less scholarly attention. As far 
as other countries are concerned, China provides a different and unique social media 
environment for scholarly studies. Although Twitter is blocked in China because of the 
country’s Internet censorship (Bamman, Connor, and Smith, 2012), China creates its own 
social media system. Chinese social media made a strong showing in the 
GlobalWebIndex report in 2012, which claimed that except for Facebook, Google+, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn, the remaining social media on their top-ten list were all Chinese 
platforms (Ong, 2012). 
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Featuring almost the same layout and functions as Twitter, Weibo—the “Chinese 
Twitter”—has 198 million monthly active users in China alone (Bischoff, 2015), which is 
more than half of Twitter’s monthly active users around the globe (316 million) (Statista, 
2015). Further, since Weibo started its operation in 2009, a new public sphere 
characterized by deliberative criticism for democracy has emerged in China (Reese & 
Dai, 2009). Weibo has become a highly interactive place where the media, various 
groups, and individuals can criticize, discuss, and report on the current political system, 
government policies, government officials’ scandals, and general social problems. It is 
one of the most vibrant social media platforms in China (Chao, 2010). Therefore, Weibo 
provides an ideal example of Chinese social media platforms. As a result, the purpose of 
this dissertation is to examine the agenda-setting effects on Weibo.  
The first goal of this study is to determine and compare the news agendas of 
various opinion leaders on Weibo. The news agenda is a set of issues that are ranked in a 
hierarchy of importance at a given point in time, such as the economy, health care, 
education, or war (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). The issue agenda of the opinion leaders on 
Weibo indicates what issue the opinion leaders consider as most and least important. An 
increasing number of studies have shown that social media present a distinctive news 
agenda that is independent from the news agendas of traditional media (Frederick, Burch, 
& Blaszka, 2015; Groshek & Groshek, 2013; Jungherr, 2014; Neuman, Guggenheim, 
Jang, & Bae, 2014). The result indicates that social media are able to create a news 
agenda “without having to rely on traditional media to act as gatekeeper or fact-checker 
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or moderator” (Metzgar & Marrugi, 2009, p. 152). It also leads scholars to argue that 
social media have challenged traditional media’s dominant position in communication 
and made traditional media just one of many news sources on the Internet to set the 
public agenda (Kwak, Park, & Moon, 2010; Wu, Atkin, Lau, Lin, & Mou, 2013). Other 
influential news sources are considered opinion leaders on social media platforms; these 
sources include famous public figures, media-affiliated individuals, celebrities, political 
bloggers, think tanks, interest groups, and even ordinary people (Cho & Shin, 2014; 
Dubois & Gaffney, 2014; Leavitt, Burchard, Fisher, & Gilbert, 2009; Park, 2013; 
Parmelee, 2014). Therefore, the agenda-setting effects on social media platforms are no 
longer a linear process, either from traditional media to the public or the reverse. It has 
become a diversified and dynamic process through which traditional media and various 
opinion leaders on social media platforms compete to set the news agenda for the public. 
However, previous agenda-setting studies tend to treat the news agenda on social media 
platforms as monolithic and fail to distinguish the news agendas of various opinion 
leaders on social media platforms. This dissertation adds to previous studies by 
differentiating the news agendas of different opinion leaders on Weibo and comparing 
these agendas to find out the similarities and differences. Additionally, in order to verify 
the gender differences in opinion leadership and social media use, which were discovered 
in previous studies (Anderson, 2015; Fu & Chau, 2014; Katz, 1957), this dissertation also 
compares the news agendas of male and female opinion leaders on Weibo. 
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Moreover, the study further compares the news agendas of the opinion leaders 
with that of traditional Chinese media to find out who leads the discussion on Weibo and 
how. As opinions vary, no unanimous conclusion has been drawn upon who sets the news 
agenda on social media platforms. Some scholars argue that traditional media still set the 
news agenda because media organizations and media-affiliated individuals are major 
information disseminators on Internet-based media (Hu et al., 2012). For example, Kwak, 
Park, and Moon (2010) compared trending topics on Twitter with trends on Google and 
CNN headlines. They discovered that more than half of the trending topics were first 
reported by CNN, although there were cases where news broke from Twitter. Other 
scholars have argued that although traditional media outlets are good at breaking the 
news in the early stage, opinion leaders such as celebrities are critical for spreading the 
news to a wider audience later on (Leavitt, Burchard, Fisher, & Gilbert. 2009). Some 
studies about Twitter even determined that the news flow starts from a handful of elite 
users on the website, such as think tanks, interest groups, and celebrities (Cha, Haddadi, 
Benevenuto, & Gummadi, 2010; Cho & Shin, 2014; Park, 2013; Parmelee, 2014). Given 
the mixed results of previous studies, more studies need to be conducted to further verify 
the agenda-setting effects in the world of social media. Therefore, this dissertation tests 
the agenda-setting effects among different influential groups on Weibo, including the 
media outlets, media professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business elites. 
Third, this dissertation compares the agenda-setting effects on Weibo in crisis and 
non-crisis news. Previous agenda-setting studies about social media mainly focus on one 
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specific issue at a time, most of which are crisis news. Their results indicate that social 
media tend to set the traditional media agenda in moments of crisis, such as political 
activism, natural disasters, and social emergencies (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; 
Cho & Shin, 2014; Kim & Lee, 2006; Kongthon et al., 2012). Twitter’s agenda-setting 
function is quite frequent and evident in cases of natural disasters and social emergencies, 
such as the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, and the airplane crash in the Hudson River in 
2009 (e.g. Cho & Shin, 2014; Kongthon et al., 2012). Another common theme of 
previous agenda-setting studies on Twitter is political issues (e.g. Colleoni, Rozza, & 
Arvidsson, 2014; Parmelee & Bichard, 2011; Vargo, Guo, McCombs, & Shaw, 2014). 
The reason that agenda-setting studies on Twitter concentrate on crisis news and political 
campaigns is self-evident; these issues easily capture public attention and generate fierce 
discussion in the world of social media. However, crisis news and political news are not 
the only matters that cause concern. Other kinds of issues, such as employment, race, 
gender, culture, and pollution, are among the trending topics on Twitter and Weibo 
(Twitter, 2015; Weibo, 2015). Unfortunately, these issues received much less scholarly 
attention. Therefore, this dissertation aims to broaden the subject areas of previous 
agenda-setting studies by comparing a crisis news—the case of Tianjin explosion—with 
a non-crisis news—the case of Tu Youyou winning the Nobel Prize in medicine.   
In conclusion, the purpose of this dissertation includes differentiating the news 
agendas of traditional media and various opinion leaders on Weibo, examining the 
agenda-setting effects between traditional media outlets and these opinion leaders on 
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Weibo, and comparing the agenda-setting effects on Weibo in crisis and non-crisis news. 
Specifically, this dissertation includes two studies. The first study applied an intermedia 
agenda-setting approach to examine the agenda-setting effects between traditional media 
outlets and various opinion leaders on Weibo. This study utilized a Granger causality test, 
which is a type of time series analysis, to discover the directional correlations between 
the media agendas and the agendas of various opinion leaders on Weibo, which in turn 
reveals whether the media outlets or the opinion leaders set the news agenda on Weibo. 
The second study conducted a comparative agenda-setting study to examine the agenda-
setting effects among the media outlets and opinion leaders in crisis and non-crisis news 
on Weibo. The comparative study selected two cases on Weibo, representing crisis news 
and non-crisis news respectively, and applied a network analysis to compare the attribute 
networks of the media outlets and the opinion leaders on Weibo for both cases.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
 
First, this dissertation contributes to social media studies by examining Weibo, 
one of China’s most popular social media platforms. Social media platforms have 
attracted much scholarly attention since the rise of Facebook and Twitter (e.g. Conway et 
al., 2015; Ellison, Vitak, Gray & Lampe, 2014; Fu & Chau, 2014; Groshek & Groshek, 
2013; Kongthon et al., 2012; Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang, & Bae, 2014; Russell, 
2013; Skogerbø & Krumsvik, 2015; Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). While people 
are passionate about the use and the effects of Facebook and Twitter, it is important to 
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acknowledge that 1.3 billion Chinese people, who make up about 20% of the world’s 
population, are officially blocked outside of this social media world. However, 
restrictions on foreign websites and social media in China have resulted in a flourishing 
home-grown, state-approved social media system, where Chinese netizens actively 
engage in the discussions of various political and social issues (Crampton, 2011). Chinese 
social media is different from Western social media in the way that it opens up a new 
public sphere characterized by civic participation and democratic discussion, which used 
to be impossible in an authoritarian country. The newly established public sphere in 
China not only allows Chinese netizens to express more-or-less freely in public discourse 
(Ji, 2016), but it also can foster social movement for democracy, which will ultimately 
result in political reforms (Tong & Lei, 2010). Unfortunately, Chinese social media as 
well as the changes in China’s public sphere remain strange to people of other countries 
mainly because of the language barrier. Therefore, this dissertation adds to previous 
literature on social media studies, reveals the current status and dynamics of Chinese 
social media, and provides another source for people hailing other countries to learn 
about Chinese social media. This new research about Weibo also helps bring attention to 
lay opinions in China. It is an academic endeavor to test how Chinese social media 
challenge the government-controlled public sphere by allowing different and divergent 
voices, which will ultimately be able to affect change in the country. 
Second, this dissertation provides theoretical contributions to agenda-setting 
theory by applying the theory to Chinese social media. Although agenda-setting theory is 
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supposed to work only in a free media system (McCombs, 2004), a number of studies 
have either utilized the theory to study public opinions in China or predicted that there is 
an agenda-setting effect in China, be it from the media to the public or the reverse (Liu & 
Ji, 2012; Luo, 2011; Luo, 2014; Wang, 2008; Wang, 2013). However, many of these 
studies examined the news agendas on online discussion boards or certain websites. A 
few studies focused on the news agenda on Weibo but they either failed to directly test 
the agenda-setting effects (Fu & Chau, 2014) or merely studied one specific topic at a 
time (Peng, 2014; Wu et al., 2013). This dissertation not only presents a general picture 
of various influential agendas on Weibo but also focuses on two different issues as well. 
It is the first study to systematically examine the news agendas of various opinion leaders 
and test the agenda-setting effects between the opinion leaders and the media outlets on 
Weibo. 
Additionally, previous agenda-setting studies on social media usually compare the 
news agendas of traditional media outlets (e.g. newspapers, television) with the news 
agendas of social media platforms as a whole (e.g. Kushin, 2010; Moon, 2010). However, 
almost all major media organizations and individuals nowadays have one or more social 
media accounts. It is indisputable that the media industry is migrating to a digital world. 
The agendas of traditional media outlets to some degree are parts of the social media 
agenda at large. The trend has changed social media into a platform where traditional 
media outlets and other news sources publish news and interact with their audiences. A 
number of studies used advanced methods of big data analysis and found that the agenda-
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setting process on Twitter involves the interaction of different influential groups and 
depends on issue topics (e.g. Cha et al, 2010; Hu et al., 2012). From this perspective, the 
complexity and dynamics of agenda-setting effects on social media platforms deserve 
further clarification. This dissertation approached the agenda-setting effects of social 
media from a completely different perspective, recognizing and differentiating the 
segmented agendas on social media platforms. It examined more nuanced agenda-setting 
effects among the most influential groups on social media platforms, determining and 
comparing the news agendas of these groups.  
Besides the theoretical contribution to agenda-setting theory, the dissertation 
makes methodological contributions to agenda-setting studies as well. It tests both the 
traditional agenda-setting effect and the networked agenda-setting effect (NAS model) on 
Chinese social media, which verifies the validity and reliability of the newly developed 
NAS model and expands the methodological development of agenda-setting theory to a 
different cultural context. It provides groundwork for future research that is interested in 
either the NAS model or the agenda-setting effects within Chinese context.  
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Chapter Two: Agenda-Setting Theory 
 
Since the idea of “the world outside and the pictures in our head” was developed 
by Walter Lippmann in early 1920s, the study of journalism and mass communication has 
developed and evolved around the influence of the media on the public (Lippmann, 1922, 
p3). In line with this school of thought, a variety of theories have emerged in order to 
better understand how the media affect public opinion, among which is one of the most 
popular communication theories—agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
Agenda-setting theory is special because "it is an indigenous theory born from this field 
of research (mass communication), not from other disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology, or political science" (Takeshita, 2006, p.291). It also sets the theoretical 
framework for this dissertation. This chapter will briefly discuss the development of 
agenda-setting theory during the past decades, followed by the descriptions of the 
intermedia agenda-setting effect and the NAS model, which are used in this dissertation.  
THE EVOLUTION OF AGENDA-SETTING THEORY 
 
The core concept of agenda-setting theory is the transfer of salience from the 
media agenda to the public agenda, including issue salience (first-level agenda setting) 
and attribute salience (second-level agenda setting). Since McCombs and Shaw proposed 
the theory in their 1968 Chapel Hill study (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), agenda setting has 
been frequently tested in a variety of disciplines (Coleman, McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 
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2009) and in different countries (McCombs, 2005). The theory has gone through four 
stages of evolution (McCombs & Bell, 1996). 
The original Chapel Hill study and all the studies replicating it (e.g. Funkhouser, 
1973; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Palmgreen & Clarke, 1977) belong to the first phase, 
which is characterized by studies on different kinds of salience transfer from the media 
agenda to the public agenda. The second phase integrates uses and gratifications theory, 
which argues that audiences are active participants during the communication process 
and they select the media content based on their needs (McCombs & Bell, 1996). 
Therefore, the agenda-setting effect is mediated by the need for orientation (Matthes, 
2006; McCombs & Weaver, 1973; McCombs & Bell, 1996; McCombs, 2004; Valenzuela 
& McCombs, 2009). The third phase of agenda-setting research focuses on different 
kinds of news agendas. For example, McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes (1974) examined the 
agenda-setting effects of three different public agendas, including the intrapersonal public 
agenda (the issues a person is most concerned with), the interpersonal public agenda (the 
issues a person talks about with his/her families and friends), and the perceived 
community public agenda (the issues other people in one’s community are most 
concerned about). The development of the Internet and new technologies results in the 
proliferation of media channels and the popularity of social media, which gives rise to the 
fourth phase of agenda-setting studies. The fourth phase mainly answers the question 
"who sets the news agenda?" instead of "who sets the public agenda?" Agenda-setting 
studies in this phase examine the intermedia agenda-setting effects, which refers to the 
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relationships among the news agendas of different media channels, including traditional 
media, blogs, online discussion boards, and social media (Boyle, 2001; Cho & Shin, 
2014; Gold & Simmons, 1965; Kongthon et al., 2012; Kushin, 2010; Meraz, 2011; Reese 
& Danielian, 1989; Roberts & McCombs, 1994). The first study of this dissertation 
focuses on the fourth phase and will apply the intermedia agenda-setting approach to 
explore the agenda-setting effects on Weibo.  
INTERMEDIA AGENDA SETTING 
 
Intermedia agenda-setting studies at the early stage compare the news agendas of 
different traditional media outlets. For example, Gold and Simmons (1965) concluded 
that local news agendas were strongly affected by wire service reports. Reese and 
Danielian (1989) found that The New York Times set the agenda for other newspapers in 
covering drug-related deaths. Roberts and McCombs (1994) investigated the agenda-
setting effects during the 1990 Texas gubernatorial campaign and confirmed that political 
advertising exerted influence on the news agendas of newspapers and television 
programs. Boyle’s (2001) study of the 1996 presidential campaign also found a 
significant impact of candidate television advertising on the network news and all three 
of the major newspapers analyzed. As the rise of the Internet and online media, scholarly 
attention has shifted to intermedia agenda-setting effects between traditional media and 
new media on the Internet. For example, Meraz (2011) compared the traditional media 
agendas and the blog agendas, finding that left-leaning blogs shared strongly correlated 
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attribute agendas with traditional media, while there were few significant correlations 
between the right-leaning blogs and traditional media. The study also found weak ties 
between the moderate blog agendas and the traditional media agendas, which suggests 
that the moderate blogs provide a platform for liberal and diverse political conversation 
(Meraz, 2011).  
Thanks to the rapid development of Internet communication technologies, the 
advent of social media has brought about another hot bed for intermedia agenda-setting 
studies. The popularity of social media platforms, especially among young people, has 
made them an alternative to traditional news media organizations. The public can search, 
share, comment, and most importantly, produce news by themselves on social media 
platforms. Social media also keep increasing their emphasis on news, and the majority of 
Twitter and Facebook users now use them as a source for news (Johnson & Yang, 2009; 
Kushin, 2010; Pew, 2015). Communication scholars have considered Twitter a news 
source as well because its retweet function serves as a communication channel of 
information flow and retweets can quickly reach a larger audience (Kwak, Lee, Park, & 
Moon, 2010). However, social media are different from traditional news media in the 
way that they create a platform where various media outlets and other news sources (e.g. 
families, friends, and organizations) coexist and interact.  
News dissemination on social media platforms is through both interpersonal 
communication and media-to-the public communication (Domingos & Richardson, 2001; 
Kossinets & Watts, 2006; Papacharissi, 2010; Park, 2013; Wu, Hofman, Mason, &Watts, 
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2011). Furthermore, social media allow the voices of both mainstream and marginalized 
groups in society to be heard while also generating discussions about issues that are 
neglected or covered less in mainstream media (Cross, 2011). This phenomenon has led 
to a more diverse and fragmented news agenda on social media platforms, which cannot 
be related to the traditional media agenda as a whole (Frederick, Burch, & Blaszka, 
2015). As a result, social media users tend to get news from a broader mix of news 
sources, including ordinary individuals, news organizations, non-news organizations, 
journalists, and others (Pew, 2012). These news sources are opinion leaders on social 
media platforms, who are able to report news information and affect the public opinion in 
the same way as traditional media. Under this context, the news agenda on social media 
platforms is not monolithic and the agenda-setting effects on social media platforms 
involve the participation of both the media outlets and various opinion leaders. The past 
decade has witnessed a number of intermedia agenda-setting studies examining the 
agenda-setting effects between social media and traditional media (Cho & Shin, 2014; 
Conway et al., 2015; Frederick, Burch, & Blaszka, 2015; Groshek & Groshek, 2013; 
Kongthon et al., 2012; Kushin, 2010). However, very few studies differentiated the 
agendas of various opinion leaders on social media platforms. Therefore, the first study 
of this dissertation addresses this question by mapping out the news agendas of different 
opinion leaders on Weibo and comparing the agenda-setting effects between the media 
and these opinion leaders on Weibo.  
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Network Agenda Setting (NAS) Model  
As a news source, social media also complicate news dissemination patterns by 
allowing people to connect with each other to form their personal networks and share 
information freely with others. To put it another way, social media have visualized 
people’s invisible personal and information networks in society, illustrating humans’ 
complex cognitive representations of connecting and associating various elements 
together to learn (Kaplan, 1973; Anderson & Bower, 2014). However, traditional agenda-
setting theory is based on the assumption that information transmission between the 
media and the public is both linear and discrete, without overlap or interaction (Vu, Guo, 
& McCombs, 2014). It cannot detect how the public associate issues or attributes, or 
whether that is influenced by media coverage or other factors. In response to the rise of 
social media, Guo and McCombs (2011) introduced network analysis into the realm of 
agenda-setting studies, leading to the birth of network agenda setting (NAS) model (Guo, 
2013; Guo &McCombs, 2011a, 2011b; Vargo, Guo, McCombs, & Shaw, 2014; Vu, Guo, 
& McCombs, 2014).  
The NAS model uses network analysis to map out the interrelations among 
various elements in the media agenda and the public agenda, and then compares the two 
network agendas (Guo, 2012). It argues that the salience of interrelationships among 
various issues and/or attributes can be transferred from the media to the public. Although 
the NAS model is relatively new, studies have shown that the salience of the networked 
relationships among objects and/or attributes can be transferred from the media to the 
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public (Guo &McCombs, 2011a, 2011b). For example, Guo and McCombs (2011) 
compared the media and public agenda networks of the political candidate attributes in 
the Texas gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial elections in 2002. The results found that the 
two networks were significantly correlated with each other, which supported the model. 
The NAS model is further supported in several intermedia agenda-setting studies, finding 
that the salience of networked news agendas can be transferred among different media 
outlets (Guo & Vargo, 2015; Guo et al., 2015; Vargo et al., 2014; Vu, Guo, & McCombs, 
2014). The first intermedia agenda-setting study using the NAS model is a comparative 
international study, which compares the networked attribute agendas in news coverage of 
the Iraq War in six countries (Guo et al., 2015). The study found that the networked 
agendas of news coverage on the Iraq War were similar in countries with the same 
political stance on the war.  
In general, the NAS model improves traditional agenda-setting theory by 
expanding the discrete issue/attribute agenda to a networked agenda, which mimics 
humans’ cognitive representations of the world. It is especially efficient to test the 
agenda-setting effects in situations that involve various factors or attributes. It is because 
the NAS model can provide a comprehensive picture of an issue by presenting the 
interrelationships of its various attributes. As a result, the NAS model is a more optimal 
way to test the agenda-setting effects on social media, where the discussions of a trending 
topic always involve millions of posts emphasizing a wide spectrum of relative attributes 
of the topic. The second study of this dissertation aims to find out whether the agenda-
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setting effects on Weibo differ in crisis and non-crisis news. Since the study examines 
two trending issues on Weibo that consist of various attributes respectively, it will use the 
NAS model to explore the networked attribute agendas of the media outlets and the 
opinion leaders for both cases as well as to find out their interrelationships.  
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Chapter Three: Chinese Social Media and Agenda Setting 
 
Chinese media at the outset are designed by political leaders as a government 
instrument for social and political control (Chan, 2007). Not only media organizations but 
also Chinese journalists were tightly controlled by the state. For decades, the meaning of 
being a journalist in China, especially in official media organizations such as Xinhua 
News agency, was different from that in the Western countries. Journalism was a political 
career and Chinese journalists were more like "publicists" who distributed information to 
mass audiences under the supervision of the state (Dong, Park, & Chang, 2013). The 
governing style of the media system was copied from the Soviet Union, where the media 
was controlled by the government and existed merely to fulfill the agenda of the single 
ruling party (Lynch, 1999). The propaganda role of Chinese media as serving the 
communist party and government policies remained the same until China’s economic 
reform at the end of 1970s, which significantly changed the media landscape in China for 
the first time.  
Since 1978, when China’s marketization was set in motion, momentum toward 
less state control of the media has been building (Kalathil, 2002). The trends of 
globalization and marketization, coupled with the new media technology from live 
television as well as the Internet, have strongly challenged the media system in China. 
The opening-up process of the Chinese media reached a crescendo in 2003 when China 
was hit by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003. The SARS epidemic was a 
rude awakening for the Chinese government, whose attempts to control media 
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information and cover up the news only backfired. Propelled by both domestic and 
international criticism, the Chinese government realized that information control was no 
longer feasible while information disclosure was clearly in order (Tai & Sun, 2007). In 
response, China established a press spokespeople system across central and local 
governments in order to communicate with the media (Wang, 2011). By 2011, every 
department at all levels of the government had spokesmen who represent and speak for 
the central and local governments, especially in times of crisis (Yoon Park, 2011). The 
move shook off the existing media system and gave birth to critical journalism, which 
enabled journalists to be separate from the political system and conduct investigative 
reports (Dong, Park, & Chang, 2013).  
Driven by the free economic market, the Chinese media industry, which used to 
rely on government subsidy and support, started to earn revenues through advertisements 
in late 1980s (Ge, 2011). The majority of Chinese media outlets had become financially 
independent by 2003, with exception of a handful of official news organizations directly 
controlled by national and local governments, such as People’s Daily, Xinhua News 
Agency, and CCTV (Shirk, 2010). Meanwhile, a group of semi-privatized commercial 
media, such as Caijing, Phoenix television, and other local satellite television stations, 
emerged through the process of marketization, expanding press freedom in China to a 
great extent and quickly gaining unprecedented public trust and popularity (Dong, Park, 
& Chang, 2013). Commercial media outlets have been cautiously testing the limits of 
media control and are willing to push the state on politically sensitive topics such as 
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government misconduct and free speech (Kalathil, 2002). They offer journalists 
opportunities to report of their own free will and support them when they get into trouble 
with the government. Throughout the trends of marketization and pluralism, Chinese 
journalists have evolved from state employees to investigative reporters who have gained 
sufficient autonomy while covering the news except in regard to coverage of politics, 
political figures, or anything related (Lee, 2005). Chinese journalists have also learned to 
use “tactics” such as puns and historical allusions to evade and resist government control 
of the media (Pan & Lu, 2003).  
In addition to changes in the Chinese media system and journalism industry, the 
marketization trend has also led to changes in editorial and marketing strategies in 
Chinese news organizations. Rather than advocating government policies as before, both 
official and commercial news organizations began to tilt toward being audience oriented, 
with an emphasis on educating and entertaining the public, as well as promoting China’s 
economic development (Hong & Cuthbert, 1991; Zhao, 1998). Not only news content but 
also news genres and techniques changed to cater to the audience (Pan, 2000). For 
example, China Central Television (CCTV), one of the state-owned news organizations, 
established the News Commentary Department in 1994 and produced a number of 
programs in the form of a combination of in-depth journalistic report and commentaries. 
These programs, such as Oriental Horizon (Dongfangshikong) and Focus 
(Jiaodianfangtan), were among the highest rated TV programs in China that had 
profound impact on Chinese society (Li, 2002). Chinese official newspapers, such as 
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People’s Daily, also provided more user-friendly news than before (Kalathil, 2002). 
Although official news organizations have been adapting to the new climate slowly, they 
tread carefully and never break the rules. Differently, commercial media outlets in China 
carried out bold reforms and their journalists embarked on brave quests for 
professionalism. Shuli Hu, former editor-in-chief of Caixin magazine in China, 
weathered political pressure to investigate stock manipulation, corruption and collusion 
between corporations and official leaders in China. Her investigative reporting won her 
international acclaim and Business Week dubbed her “China’s most dangerous woman” 
in 2001. She resigned from Caixin magazine and started Caixin Media in 2009, one of the 
most influential commercial media organizations in China. Another example is Hunan 
Satellite Television, a local television station in China’s Hunan province. Hunan Satellite 
Television initiated the change in Chinese local stations in 1997, providing lively 
entertainment programs, nightly shows with investigative reporting, and human interest 
stories that have made it one of the most financially successful television stations in the 
country (Kalathil, 2002).  
Overall, the trend of marketization and globalization in China transformed the 
Chinese media industry in many different ways. Mostly importantly, the trend gave birth 
to a number of commercial media organizations that are semi-privatized and driven by 
profits and journalistic professionalism. Compared to official media organizations, 
commercial media organizations in China provide more investigative reporting and 
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human interest stories, have the courage to challenge the system, and in turn are 
considered more credible by the public.  
THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN CHINA 
 
The government control of the media has been further challenged by the rise of 
the Internet in China. The Internet brought about the information revolution in China and 
offers a participatory forum where individuals gather to share information, build 
alliances, voice alternative perspectives, and ultimately become empowered (Canclini, 
2001; Downing, 2003; Kellner, 2000). Many commercial web portals make news 
coverage from different news organizations available and encourage competition among 
news organizations. News often comes out on the Internet earlier than traditional media 
can publish it, which pressures traditional media to follow and helps push the boundaries 
of acceptable news (Kalathil, 2002). Even official media outlets such as People’s Daily 
maintain a strong web presence that is more user-friendly than their official images. Their 
websites provide mixed news content ranging from politics to sports and entertainment, 
enhanced by a lively tone. Not only do official media outlets use the Internet to publish 
news content that is not acceptable on their official platforms, Chinese journalists also 
consider the Internet a pressure valve where they ventilate their story ideas and feelings 
suppressed by the system.    
As of December 2014, China had 649 million Internet users and an Internet 
penetration of 47.9% (CNNIC, 2015). With the proliferation of social media since 2009, 
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the number of registered Chinese microblog users in 2015 reached 249 million, compared 
to 8 million users in 2009 (CNNIC, 2015; Esarey & Qiang, 2011; Jiang, 2013). As far as 
Weibo is concerned, it had 198 million monthly active users in China alone as of 2015, 
96% of which were ordinary people. According to Weibo’s user report in 2015, Weibo 
users were mainly highly educated young people ages 17 to 33. Although the users were 
evenly composed of men and women, there were more women than men in the 17 to 24 
age group, while there were more men than women in the 24 to 33 age group. Moreover, 
men used Weibo as frequently as women (Weibo Report, 2015a).  
Although the group of Internet users is fairly large in China, what really matters is 
the purpose of using the Internet. Before the arrival of social media, Chinese cyberspace 
was mainly a place for socializing and entertainment (Guo, 2007). People communicated 
and shared information online, which had little to do with politics and public affairs. 
Since the advent of social media in China, more than half of Chinese netizens have used 
the Internet to express opinions intended to “supervise” government activities (Esarey & 
Qiang, 2011). The Internet has greatly contributed to political engagement in China by 
making different voices heard, creating a public sphere for political discussion, and 
organizing online collective actions (Wu, 2007).  
Despite the growing openness and diversity on the Internet, China remains one of 
the most sophisticated countries for Internet filtering and information control in the world 
(OpenNet Initiative, 2009). The Chinese government has implemented efficient ways to 
control the Internet to protect its domestic interests. It established the Great Firewall 
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(GFW), a technology that blocks access to foreign websites through IP and DNS filtering 
(Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith, 2012). Meanwhile, the government developed an 
advanced Internet filtering system through a method known as keyword-based filtering, 
which inspects the content of IP packets to determine if specific, sensitive keywords are 
present (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). These keywords mainly relate to banned historical 
events, groups, and content that potentially undermines the authority of the communist 
party as well as social stability (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). Websites and information that 
contain these keywords are blocked in China as well.   
As a result, many websites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are inaccessible to the 
majority of Chinese people. Thanks to computer technologies, Chinese people launched 
their own social media that are compatible with government censorship. As one of the 
most popular social media platforms in China, Weibo possesses almost the same designs, 
layout and functions as Twitter. The major difference is that Weibo users are allowed to 
insert graphical emotions or attach multimedia content in every post (Deutsch, 2015).   
One may question whether Weibo is free enough to allow deliberate discussion 
since it is completely confined within China’s Internet filtering system. It does, in fact, 
offer a participatory platform where Chinese netizens voice alternative perspectives and 
become empowered. The fundamentally transformative effect of social media in China is 
that they break down the government monopoly of information and push for information 
transparency and accountability (Lynch, 2011). Although the government blocks many 
international websites, there are various technological ways to jump over the Great 
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Firewall and be exposed to whatever information is on the Internet. With the help of 
computer technologies, Chinese people are able to access the blocked information and 
share them on Chinese social media, where the information will go viral. Even if the 
information is banned for certain reasons, there will always be people who have it and 
will spread it. In addition, censorship and filtering mechanisms exist in every country as 
well as in social media organizations such as Facebook and Twitter (Bamman, O’Connor, 
& Smith, 2012; Pempel, 2015). The United States censors Internet display of “child 
pornography, libel, and media that infringe on copyright or other intellectual property 
rights” (Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith, 2012, p.2), while China extends this list to 
politically sensitive issues. Both Facebook and Twitter remove content that they 
considered improper from their platforms and are governed by the laws of the country 
where they operate (Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith, 2012; Pempel, 2015). In this sense, 
although Weibo is censored by the government, it is another social media platform just 
like Facebook and Twitter. Therefore, the content and communication process on Weibo 
can be studied the same way as that on Western social media platforms. Despite the 
similarities, Chinese social media has its own peculiarities, which are explained in the 
following section.   
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA  
 
There are differences between social media in Western countries and in China. 
First, the results of a survey indicate that activists in both China and Latin America 
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consider social media as a more important tool to promote debate and discussion than 
activists in the United States, who think social media are more important for posting 
announcements and news from their groups or organizations (Harp, Bachmann, & Guo, 
2012). In addition, Western scholars argue that online activism through social media only 
enhances public awareness of certain issues but will not lead to social or political reform 
(Diamond, 2010; Harp, Bachmann, & Guo, 2012; Morozov, 2011). Conversely, online 
sharing and discussion in China quite often culminates in massive group incidents, which 
refers to online or offline events where a large number of people autonomously join 
together to express their sentiment and opinion, fight for their own interests, and possibly 
influence policy making (Bondes & Schucher, 2014). In 2003, only two massive group 
incidents occurred. By 2009, however, the number of massive Internet incidents had risen 
to 12 (Tong & Lei, 2010). These massive group incidents on Weibo have led to 
substantial reform of government policies regarding migrant workers in metropolitan, 
urban development projects, and judicial decisions (Tong & Lei, 2010). For example, an 
environmental protest against a proposed waste water pipeline in the Chinese city of 
Qidong, Jiangsu province, was organized through Weibo by a group of young people in 
July 2012. Thousands of citizens joined the protest and took to the streets, demanding the 
cancellation of the project that would pollute the local environment. The protest ended up 
with a local government policy that banned the project permanently. Therefore, social 
media are bringing a revolution to China. Although the impact is not dramatic enough to 
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change the whole political system and correct all social injustice, it is a revolution 
experienced “in a thousand tiny, everyday ways” (Thompson, 2006, p.32). 
Second, Chinese social media platforms are not merely another news source. 
They have greater impact on the journalism industry than social media in Western 
countries. Western scholars argue that traditional media still dominate the mass 
communication process, with social media playing a supplemental role (Bowman, 2008; 
Hermida & Thurman, 2008). Media outlets and journalists are the most active users on 
Twitter (Wu et al., 2011). Lots of  information shared on Twitter is from traditional 
media, especially news events and political discussions (Hu et al., 2012). Bloggers are 
also among the most influential users on Twitter. However, many famous bloggers are 
actually former or current journalists (Meraz, 2009). Although Western media nowadays 
frequently cite social media as news sources, they underscore the credibility of social 
media sources (Livingston & Asmolov, 2010). On the contrary, social media have 
revolutionized the way traditional media and journalists do their work. PR Newswire 
Asia surveyed 2,503 Chinese journalists and revealed that more than 90 percent of the 
respondents consider news originating from social media valuable and almost half of 
them regularly use Weibo to obtain news (Dowell, 2010). Information reported by 
Chinese netizens on social media platforms serves as a news database from which 
traditional media and journalists select some stories for further investigation (Luo, 2011), 
and a great number of story ideas covered by traditional media are introduced through 
Weibo (Wang, 2013). Although traditional media in China are tightly controlled by the 
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government, ordinary people are able to utilize social media to break stories on sensitive 
issues that are usually banned in traditional media. The cumulative public expression on 
social media platforms, therefore, not only attracts media attention but also legitimizes 
traditional media’s coverage on sensitive issues. It is because public opinion on social 
media platforms has become a barometer for the Chinese government to know public 
sentiments and implement policies (Luo, 2011; Tai, 2006). Both characteristics of 
Chinese social media discussed above indicate a different communication pattern on 
Chinese social media compared to Western social media, which makes it worthwhile to 
study the agenda-setting effect on Weibo.  
Public opinion on social media platforms has become so powerful that it results in 
even harsher government censorship on the Internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2009). Chinese 
authorities proposed that social media users should register with their real names, which 
incurred violent opposition from Chinese netizens (Xinhua News, 2012). Not only the 
Chinese government but the governments in so-called liberal countries feel helpless in the 
face of the increasing power of social media. Even the U.S. government fears the 
potential power of social media and tries to extinguish activist efforts of citizen 
journalism through intimidation (Wall, 2009). In response to censorship on social media 
platforms, “Chinese social media users have grown savvy at expressing themselves 
through political satire, spoofing, and ironic uses of politically correct language” to avoid 
government punishment (Esarey & Xiao, 2008; Rosen, 2009).  
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OPINION LEADERS ON CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
What is unique about social media such as Twitter and Weibo is that different 
news sources, either groups or individuals, interact with and adapt to each other in order 
to compete to lead the information flow on the Internet. News information on these social 
media platforms can reach a large number of people from all walks of life, which can be 
explained by Granovetter’s (1973) theory of “the strength of weak ties.” The theory 
defines weak ties in a relationship network as having less personal intimacy and 
emotional bonding than strong ties. It further argues that information always reaches a 
larger number of people and traverses greater social distance through weak ties rather 
than strong ties (Granovetter, 1973). The relationship on Facebook is a good example of 
strong ties because people tend to connect only with their friends or someone they know 
on this website. The connection between liked-minded people on Facebook in turn results 
in homogenous information on their social networks. Conversely, Twitter and Weibo 
users have “followers” rather than “friends” and the connections on these platforms are 
based on content rather than relationships (Virk, 2011). The weak ties on Twitter and 
Weibo as well as the retweet function greatly contribute to rapid information diffusion 
and fierce discussion among different groups and individuals on these platforms. It is the 
discussion, expression and exchange of ideas within such online public space that impact 
what the online participants perceive to be important (Lee, Lacendorder & Lee, 2005; 
Watts & Dodds, 2007). The phenomenon is termed by scholars as “collective 
intelligence,” referring to the collective contributions of many dispersed individuals 
30 
 
creating a community of knowledge (Kwak, Park, and Moon, 2010; Tapscott & Williams, 
2006).  
The emergence of collective intelligence can be attributed to three major trends 
taking place in this digital world. First, the rise of new media and technologies gives birth 
to a great number of news sources on the Internet, which results in fragmented audiences 
and interactive two-way communication. The active Internet users do not need to stick to 
a specific news media outlet for information because of the wider range of online 
choices. Second, public trust in traditional news media and the journalism industry has 
declined dramatically so that traditional media are not gaining new audiences but rather 
losing them to new media (Cross, 2011). The managed communication routines that 
define contemporary elections and governance processes (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; 
Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) can be easily made public on social media platforms. 
Younger people all over the world know too much about the manipulated political system 
and develop profound political and media cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Cook, 
1998; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Ryfe, 2006). They are breaking away from 
consuming traditional news and leaning towards their peers, friends, and trusted experts 
for information (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Domingos & Richardson 2001; Hamilton, 
2004). Finally, interpersonal communication has become increasingly amplified through 
social media. The most common way of disseminating information on social media 
platforms is through interpersonal communication, referring to people sharing and 
commenting to each other’s posts. Because ordinary people share and comment about 
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what they perceive as important, they automatically get involved in the agenda-setting 
process on social media platforms (Kushin, 2010). 
These trends together have given rise to the emergence of opinion leaders on 
social media platforms. The original concept of “opinion leaders” comes from the two-
step flow model, which argues that news information stemming from the media reaches 
the mass population through opinion leaders (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). 
Traditional opinion leaders are individuals who have higher levels of education, larger 
personal networks, and more frequent access to the media than ordinary people (Katz, 
1957). Applying this concept to social media, communication scholars target opinion 
leaders on Twitter by measuring the influence of Twitter users. Some studies measured 
“influence” based on the number of followers (e.g. Weng, Lim, Jiang, & He, 2010). 
Others argued that the number of followers is not a meaningful measure of influence, 
instead defining it as the number of times an individual user is mentioned and/or 
retweeted (Cha & Gummadi, 2010; Sousa, 2010). Cha et al. (2013) differentiated and 
compared three measures of influence—the number of followers, retweets, and mentions. 
They argued that the number of followers indicates a user’s popularity but has no 
relationship with engaging audience and retweets, the number of retweets signify the 
content value of a user’s tweet, while the number of mentions represents the name value 
of a user (Cha et al., 2013). There are also scholars claiming that measuring influence 
based on only one factor is not as efficient as considering different aspects of influence at 
the same time (e.g. Lee, Kwak, Park, & Moon, 2010). Sysomos—a social media analytics 
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and monitoring tool—calculated the authority rankings of Twitter users based on several 
factors, including number of followers, frequency of updates, and retweets (Sysomos, 
2015). This dissertation defines the influence of Weibo opinion leaders in a similar way 
that calculates their rankings based on a variety of influential factors.  
Obviously, different definitions of influence result lead to different kinds of 
opinion leaders on Twitter. Cha et al. (2013) found that the most followed users are a 
wide variety of public figures and media outlets, the most tweeted users are content 
aggregation service, business men and news sites, and the most mentioned people are 
mainly celebrities. Other influential opinion leaders on Twitter include journalists, 
professors, celebrities, organizations, political bloggers, think tanks, and interest groups 
(Cho & Shin, 2014; Dubois & Gaffney, 2014; Leavitt et al., 2009; Park, 2013; Parmelee, 
2014).  
According to Lazarsfeld’s concept of opinion leader, news information stems 
from the media and opinion leaders serve as an intermediary between the media and the 
public. However, news flow on Twitter does not necessarily start from the media because 
the opinion leaders are capable of posting news information on Twitter as fast as or even 
faster than the media (Cho & Shin, 2014; Leavitt et al., 2009; Park, 2013; Parmelee, 
2014). Furthermore, different opinion leaders play distinctive roles in the information 
dissemination process on Twitter. For example, media professionals are successful at 
breaking out the news at early stages, while celebrities are critical to spread the news to 
the audience later on (Hu et al., 2012; Leavitt et al., 2009).  
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Opinion leaders on Chinese social media platforms have received much less 
scholarly attention compared to Twitter. The dissertation found only one academic study 
about Chinese opinion leaders on Weibo. In 2009, a public opinion research lab in Fudan 
University of China designed a study to find out the most influential Weibo users, which 
is the first and the only official ranking of opinion leaders on Weibo (Wang, 2013). The 
study used PALAS, well-known Internet information monitoring system, to track Weibo 
users’ activities and compiled a list of top 100 opinion leaders on Weibo and specifically 
named the top ten male and female opinion leaders, top ten young opinion leaders, and 
top ten opinion leaders in different fields on Weibo. PALAS is similar to Sysomos in the 
United States and is commonly used by Chinese government and corporations to monitor 
public opinion on websites. The study concluded that a typical opinion leader in China 
was a middle-aged scholar or businessman and the most influential opinion leaders on 
Weibo included media professionals, scholars, and businessmen (Su, Zhang, & Zhang, 
2009). One agenda-setting study on Chinese online discussion forums argued that online 
activists and journalists were the major opinion leaders in the agenda-setting process on 
the Internet (Luo, 2011). More recently, Fu and Chau (2014) studied a grassroots 
movement on Weibo, finding that media professionals and business elites were playing a 
critical role in online grassroots movements. However, celebrities were opinion leaders 
for a sensational incident on Weibo that was not followed and covered by any media 
outlet.  
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Based on the findings of previous studies, the opinion leaders on Weibo and 
Twitter share some similarities. Media professionals, celebrities, scholars, and public 
figures (e.g. business elites in China) are the most influential opinion leaders on both 
social media outlets. Much has been said about the opinion leaders on Twitter, but little is 
known about the opinion leaders on Weibo in regard to their news agendas. Therefore, 
this dissertation aims to map out the news agendas of different opinion leaders on Weibo, 
including media professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business elites. The following 
research questions were proposed: 
 
RQ1: What are the issue agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo, including a) 
media professionals, b) celebrities, c) scholars, and d) business elites?  
RQ2: Are the issue agendas of these opinion leaders correlated with each other?  
Gender differences of opinion leaders on Weibo 
 
While examining the agendas of opinion leaders on Weibo, it is also important to 
assess these stances based on gender. Gender differences exist in both news industry (e.g. 
Armstrong, 2004; Thiel-Stern, 2006) and society (e.g. Warner, 2014). And gender 
differences of opinion leaders are not news. The pioneer studies on opinion leaders 
already found gender differences in opinion leadership decades ago, stating that men 
were more likely than women to be opinion leaders in the realm of public affairs 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & William, 1954; Katz, 1957). The finding is understandable 
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because men and women have different news interests and habits. Women are more 
interested than men in stories about weather, health and safety, natural disasters, and 
tabloid news. Men show more interest than women in stories about international affairs, 
political news, and sports (Pew, 2008). Similar results have been found on Twitter, where 
more women pay attention to posts about weather and traffic, entertainment, and crime, 
as well as health and medicine (Pew, 2015). In terms of social media use, women have 
been more avid users of social media than men in the United States, although men are 
catching up (Anderson, 2015). Specifically, women are more likely to use Facebook and 
Instagram, while men are more likely to use online discussion forums like Reddit and 
Digg. There are not significant gender differences on Twitter or LinkedIn (Anderson, 
2015). 
Regarding news content, women are misrepresented and less represented in 
traditional media because of the male dominance in both society and newsrooms 
(Armstrong, 2004; Brown et al., 1987; Cullity & Younger, 2009). Statistics show few 
women in the United States hold political office (Artwick, 2013), seats in the judiciary 
(Refki, Eshete, & Hajiani 2012), and the position of chief executive officers in big 
companies (Warner, 2014). In newsrooms, women were less likely than men to be 
appointed as chief editors of traditional media organizations and online publications 
(Thiel-Stern, 2006). Compared to women, men dominate news coverage both as sources 
and subjects (Armstrong, 2004; Zoch & Turk, 1998). Scholars explained the gender 
disparities in both society and traditional media based on hegemony theory, which posits 
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that “the culture’s most powerful groups obtain consent for their leadership through the 
use of ideological norms” (Hardin, Dodd, & Lauffer, 2006, p.431). Those ideological 
norms form social structures that privilege certain social groups while disadvantaging 
others, including women and racial minorities. As social media platforms such as Twitter 
gain popularity among media organizations and journalists, scholars argue that social 
media actually mirror rather than challenge the gender hierarchy and disparities in 
traditional media (Armstrong & Gao, 2011; Thiel-Stern, 2006). Not only are women less 
mentioned in Tweets than men but traditional media organizations and journalists also 
tend to practice existing ways of doing things on social media platforms (Armstrong & 
Gao, 2011; Deuze, 2008; Lasorsa, Lewis, & Holton, 2012).  
As far as Chinese social media platforms are concerned, female users have been 
more actively engaged in online discussions of almost every trending topic on Weibo 
through 2015 (Weibo Report, 2015b). One study even found that female users from big 
cities in China were the major group that promoted a grassroots movement on Weibo (Fu 
& Chau, 2014). The results indicate the power of women being opinion leaders in 
Chinese social media. The fact that Chinese women show a strong presence on Weibo 
can be understood by the increasingly improving gender equality in China during the past 
six decades (Attané, 2012). Despite the extreme masculine sex ratio and traditional 
stereotypes of genders, gender equality and women’s development are among the most 
longstanding policies for promoting social and economic prosperity (China Daily, 2015). 
As early as the 1950s, constitutions and laws were issued in favor of women’s work 
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outside of the home and gender equality within household (Attané, 2012). China held the 
4
th
 World Conference on Women in 1995 and actively echoed the United Nations to 
promote the status of women in the country since then (UN Women, 1995).  
By facilitating access to health, education, and the workforce, changes took place 
in the power relationship between men and women in China. The employment rate for 
women in China is among the highest in the world, much higher than Japan and South 
Korea (Attané, 2012). The number of middle-ranking and senior female professional and 
technical personnel in 2013 account for 44.1% of the total in this category (ACWF, 
2015). One quarter of Chinese entrepreneurs are female and about 55% of new Internet 
businesses are being founded by women (ACWF, 2015). Women account for 52.1% of 
undergraduate students, 51.6% of postgraduate students, and 36.9% of doctoral students 
in China (ACWF, 2015). The highest number of self-made female billionaires on Forbes 
2013 billionaires list came from China (Flannery, 2013).  Overall, Chinese women have 
been more economically independent and have more autonomy nowadays although the 
discrepancies between urban and rural women are still vast (ACWF, 2015). The 
improved social status of women leads to enhanced social participation, which is evident 
in Chinese women’s active engagement in Weibo discussions.  
In the journalism industry, female journalists are now the majority of journalism 
workforce in China while the percentage of female journalists increased dramatically 
from 32.9% in 1997 to 52.9% in 2012 (Zhang & Su, 2012). The number of female 
business journalists is rising as well (Che, 2014). Most women worked at radio stations 
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(63.6%), magazines (62.7%), and TV stations (59.5%), while male journalists (52.8%) 
only slightly outnumbered female journalists in newspapers (Zhang & Su, 2012). 
Because little is known about gender disparities in news content of both Chinese 
traditional media and new media, this dissertation fills the gap by presenting the 
following research question: 
 
RQ3: What are the issue agendas of a) male and b) female opinion leaders on 
Weibo? 
 
Given the gender differences in news interests and opinion leadership, which was 
discussed earlier, this dissertation assumed that men and women pay attention to different 
issues on Weibo and therefore have distinctive issue agendas. Thus, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
 
H1: The issue agenda of male opinion leaders does not correlate with the issue 
agenda of female opinion leaders on Weibo. 
Traditional media and opinion leaders on Weibo  
 
Before the advent of social media, opinion leaders were supposed to pass 
information from traditional media to the public. This suggests that the media, opinion 
leaders, and the public all share the same news agenda. Because social media differ from 
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traditional media, their news agendas are different as well. Previous studies have found 
that there are more discussions of social issues, public order issues, and culture issues on 
Twitter than on traditional media (Groshek & Groshek, 2013; Neuman et al., 2014). 
Further, an increasing number of studies have shown that Twitter presents a distinctive 
news agenda that is independent from the traditional news agenda (Frederick, Burch, & 
Blaszka, 2015; Groshek & Groshek, 2013; Jungherr, 2014; Neuman et al., 2014). There is 
also evidence showing that Weibo has a different news agenda from Chinese traditional 
media (Liu & Ji, 2012; Liu & Zhang, 2013; Peng, 2014). Chinese traditional media cover 
more political and military issues while Weibo has more discussions about social events 
(Peng, 2014). The result indicates that social media are able to create a news agenda 
“without having to rely on traditional media to act as gatekeeper or fact-checker or 
moderator” (Metzgar & Marrugi, 2009, p. 152). Because opinion leaders are able to set 
the news agenda on social media platforms, the inconsistency between the traditional 
media and social media agendas possibly results from the different news agendas 
between the media and the opinion leaders on social media platforms.  
In order to verify the above assumption, this dissertation compares the news 
agendas of Chinese traditional media with the news agendas of opinion leaders on Weibo. 
As discussed previously, there are two kinds of news media in China, including the 
official media that are directly controlled by national and local governments, and the 
commercial media that are financially independent and partially privatized (Stockmann, 
2010). Media outlets such as the People’s Daily, CCTV, and China Radio Station are 
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examples of the official media, which are the mouthpiece of the government. Media 
outlets such as Southern Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily are the commercial 
media, which are famous for their investigative reporting of sensitive issues in China. 
The two kinds of news media differ in news content, the level of public trust, and the 
degree of freedom. The official media have the lowest level of public trust and almost no 
freedom, while the situations for the commercial media are reversed. Therefore, this 
dissertation differentiates the news agendas of the two kinds of news media and compares 
them with the news agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo. Thus, the following 
research question and hypothesis were proposed:  
 
RQ4: What are the issue agendas of a) the official media and b) the commercial 
media on Weibo? 
H2: The issue agenda of the official media does not correlate with the issue 
agenda of the commercial media on Weibo. 
 
Because social media in China represent a free territory where different voices are 
presented, the official media which are tightly controlled by the government may have 
little impact on the news agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo. In contrast, the 
commercial media enjoy much more autonomy than the official media and pay more 
attention to social issues of great relevance to the public (Luo, 2011), the news agenda of 
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the commercial media might share some similarities with the news agendas of the 
opinion leaders on Weibo. The dissertation thus proposes the following hypotheses: 
 
H3: The issue agenda of the official media is not correlated with the issue agendas 
of a) media professionals, b) celebrities, c) scholars, and d) business elites. 
H4: The issue agenda of the commercial media is correlated with the issue 
agendas of a) media professionals, b) celebrities, c) scholars, and d) business elites. 
INTERMEDIA AGENDA-SETTING ON CHINESE SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
Agenda-setting theory was quite influential when it was first introduced to China 
in the early 1980s (He, 2009) and has gained increasing scholarly attention in China 
during the past decades (Luo, 2013). This is possibly because the major role of Chinese 
media in guiding public opinion matches perfectly with the core concept of agenda-
setting theory (Li, 2009). Therefore, scholars assumed that the news agenda of Chinese 
media is highly correlated with the public agenda since Chinese media are supposed to 
set the agenda for the public. However, agenda-setting studies at early stages failed to 
find significant correlations between the media agenda and the public agenda in China 
(Li &Zhang, 2002; Zhang, Li, & Li, 2001). Zhang (2006) concluded that the agenda-
setting effects are complicated in China because the media agenda is highly manipulated 
and the public has no faith in Chinese media. The agenda-setting effects in China might 
be mediated by the public’s behavioral variables, psychological variables, and selective 
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exposure (Li & Chen, 2005; Zhang & Li, 2004). Following this school of thought, Zhang 
et al. (2012) argued that what Chinese people consider important for themselves as 
individuals is different from what they deem important for Chinese society (Zhang et al., 
2012). The study thus divided the public issue agenda into two types, including the 
personal issue agenda and the social issue agenda, and found that Chinese media only set 
the public’s social issue agenda but not the personal issue agenda (Zhang et al., 2012). 
The study not only reveals the agenda-setting effects in China but it also suggests the 
public agenda in China is fragmented.  
The rise of the Internet and social media gave birth to a number of intermedia 
agenda-setting studies that compared the news agendas of Chinese traditional media and 
Chinese social media (Li & Qin, 2001; Li, Qin, & Kluver, 2003; Liu & Ji, 2012; Liu 
&Zhang, 2013; Peng, 2014). The majority of these studies conclude that Chinese social 
media on the Internet are powerful enough to influence both the coverage of traditional 
media and public opinion online. There are many cases when a local issue breaks on the 
Internet, incurs fierce public discussion online, and finally attracts the attention of the 
media and national authorities (Bondes & Schucher, 2014; Fu & Chau, 2014;  Tong & 
Zuo, 2014; Yang, 2009; Zhou & Moy, 2007). However, none of these studies fully 
considered the fragmented media and public agendas in China. For example, the official 
media and the commercial media may not have similar agendas because of the 
differences in their ownership and journalistic role. Various kinds of opinion leaders may 
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focus their attention on different issues based on their own interests. Ignoring these 
differences results in false prediction of who influences whom.  
 A more recent agenda-setting study of Chinese newspapers and online discussion 
boards differentiated the issue agendas of the official and the commercial media (Luo, 
2011). Luo (2011) compared the media agendas of an official newspaper and two 
commercial newspapers with the public agendas on one official discussion board and one 
commercial-oriented discussion board in China, finding reciprocal intermedia agenda-
setting effects between them. While issue salience can be transferred from the online 
public agenda to the media agenda, Chinese media do not passively follow online public 
opinion and can set the public agenda as well (Luo, 2011). Further, the study found that 
the official newspaper set the news agenda for the public on the official discussion board, 
while the commercial newspapers had agenda-setting effects related to public opinion on 
the commercial-oriented discussion board (Luo, 2011). Luo’s study describes the diverse 
agenda-setting effects on Chinese online discussion boards resulting from the fragmented 
media and public agendas on the Internet. It calls for further clarification of the agenda-
setting effects among various media and public agendas on other social media outlets in 
China. In response to that, this dissertation proposes the following research question: 
 
RQ5: Among the different entities on Weibo, including a) official media, b) 
commercial media, c) media professionals, d) celebrities, e) scholars, and f) business 
elites, who leads the discussion on Weibo? 
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AGENDA SETTING IN CRISIS VS. NON-CRISIS NEWS ON WEIBO 
 
Previous studies have found that social media are more likely to set traditional 
media agendas in moments of crisis, such as political activism, political scandals, natural 
disasters, and social emergencies (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; Cho & Shin, 2014; 
Kongthon et al., 2012). Twitter has been frequently used to start, organize, and facilitate 
political protests in authoritarian countries, for example, the 2011 Egyptian revolution, 
the Arab Spring, and the Iranian election protests (Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013). It 
is also common to see Twitter around the world setting the traditional media’s agendas, 
especially during the time of natural disaster, such as the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack 
(Shactchman, 2008), the 2011 Japan earthquake (Lawson, 2011), and the 2011 Thai flood 
(Kongthon et al., 2012). Furthermore, Kim and Lee (2006) found that Korean social 
media tended to set the traditional media’s agenda in either political scandals or urgent 
social problems, such as the mishandling of babies in an obstetrics ward and the poor 
quality of school lunches. The phenomenon of social media setting the traditional 
media’s agenda is termed bottom-up agenda setting (Farrell & Drezner, 2008), reversed 
agenda-setting effect (Kim & Lee, 2006), or amplification process (Agre, 2002). It refers 
to a communication process through which grassroots voices and social activism 
empowered by the Internet-based media set the agenda for traditional media and facilitate 
existing forces to make political and social changes.  
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The phenomenon is prevalent in China as well. There has been a substantial 
amount of scholarly attention dedicated to natural disaster and civic activism on Weibo, 
most of which are case studies of specific incidents reported by Chinese netizens. Weibo 
is frequently used to organize protests, discuss sensitive issues, and report crisis news 
(Bondes & Schucher, 2014; Fu & Chau, 2014;  Tong & Zuo, 2014). For example, Bondes 
and Schucher (2014) content analyzed more than 4,600 Weibo posts of the 
sensationalized 2011 crash of two high-speed trains in Wenzhou city. Their results 
confirmed that Weibo was powerful in organizing civic activism, promoting political 
engagement, amplifying the online public opinion, and pressuring government action 
(Bondes & Schucher, 2014). Tong and Zuo (2014) compared the discourse of Weibo 
discussions on two social protests. They found that although local elites started the 
protests on Weibo, the length and intensity of Weibo discussions depended on whether 
the cases found their way to media coverage or attracted the attention of famous elites 
(Tong & Zuo, 2014). The involvement of national media in the online discussions of 
certain issues can dramatically amplify the impact of the issues (Luo, 2011).  
These studies have shown the ability of public opinion on Weibo in setting the 
news agenda for traditional media in moments of crisis. However, little is known about 
the agenda-setting effects during non-crisis news on Weibo. The term “crisis” is usually 
used in the fields of public relations and organizational communication. From an 
organizational perspective, crisis news is considered as “events of surprise, threat to 
organizational values, and limited time to make decisions” (Olsson, 2010, p.89). 
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Communication scholars define crisis news as events of “threat, urgency, and destruction, 
often on a monumental scale” (Iannarino, Veil, & Cotton, 2015, p.169; Seeger, Sellnow, 
& Ulmer, 2003, p.4). While the agenda-setting effects differ by news topics in traditional 
media and on Twitter (Groshek & Groshek, 2013; Neuman et al., 2014), this dissertation 
assumes that the agenda-setting effects are different in crisis and non-crisis news. 
Therefore, the dissertation first explores the agenda-setting effects among the official 
media, the commercial media and the four kinds of opinion leaders (outlined above) in 
both crisis and non-crisis news. It then compares the agenda-setting effects in crisis news 
with that in non-crisis news to find similarities and differences. The following research 
questions were proposed: 
 
RQ6: What are the agendas of a) official media, b) commercial media, and c) the 
opinion leaders on Weibo in crisis news? 
RQ7: Are the agendas of a) official media, b) commercial media, and c) the 
opinion leaders on Weibo correlated with each other in crisis news? 
 RQ8: What are the agendas of a) official media, b) commercial media, and c) the 
opinion leaders on Weibo in non-crisis news? 
RQ9: Are the agendas of a) official media, b) commercial media, and c) the 
opinion leaders on Weibo correlated with each other in non-crisis news? 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
Two studies were conducted for this dissertation, including an intermedia agenda-
setting study and a comparative agenda-setting study. The intermedia agenda-setting 
study used a content analysis to map out the issue agendas of the media outlets and 
opinion leaders on Weibo. It further applied Granger causality tests to find the agenda-
setting effects between the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo. Content analysis 
is widely used in agenda-setting studies to construct issue agendas for various entities. It 
is a systematic, objective and quantitative way to collect data for statistical tests 
(Wimmer & Dominik, 2003).  
Although the original agenda-setting study and many following studies used 
cross-lagged correlation analysis to determine agenda-setting effects among various 
media outlets, they mainly examined the agenda-setting effects of traditional media. 
Agenda-setting effects on social media platforms, however, are more transient and 
dynamic because information spreads fast on the Internet. Therefore, more recent studies 
use Granger causality tests, a type of time-series analysis that can capture the dynamic 
correlations of longitudinal data, to test agenda-setting effects on social media platforms 
(e.g. Meraz, 2011; Peng, 2014; Neuman et al., 2014). Because this study examined 
Chinese social media, it is reasonable to use Granger causality test to determine the 
agenda-setting effects on Weibo.   
The comparative agenda-setting study examined the agenda-setting effects 
between the media outlets and opinion leaders in crisis and non-crisis news on Weibo. An 
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easy way to define crisis and non-crisis situations is to use two different real cases to 
represent these circumstances. As Yin (1994) said, the case study method is commonly 
used to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. Therefore, 
this study selected two cases to represent crisis and non-crisis news and compared the 
agenda-setting effects. Although the results of case study cannot be generalized 
statistically, the results can inform the relationships among a particular set of concepts or 
sequence of events, which can be applied to other cases with similar concepts or 
sequences. Yin (2009) defined this process as analytical generalizations. Moreover, 
analytical generalizations are not conclusions but rather “working hypotheses” that can 
be verified as future case studies continue to provide findings of the same kind. 
This study conducted a content analysis to map out the networked attribute 
agendas of the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo for the selected cases, 
including the Tianjin explosion as the crisis case, and the case of Tu Youyou winning the 
Nobel Prize, as the non-crisis case. It then applied network analysis to these agendas in 
order to find the interrelationships between the networked agendas of the media outlets 
and opinion leaders in both cases. This study used network analysis because it is 
especially efficient to test agenda-setting effects involving relationships of various 
attributes, as is the case for both selected events. Network analysis demonstrates the 
interrelationships of various issues or attributes on different agendas, which describes a 
more comprehensive picture of the agenda-setting effects taking place on different media 
platforms (Guo & McCombs, 2011). This new method analyzes the agenda-setting 
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effects from a different angle and complements the original method used in previous 
studies. This dissertation used both the original and new methods to maximize reliability 
and validity.  
THE INTERMEDIA AGENDA-SETTING STUDY 
 
The intermedia agenda-setting study explores agenda-setting effects between the 
media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo. This study focuses on two kinds of Chinese 
media outlets, including the official and commercial media outlets, as well as four kinds 
of opinion leaders, including media professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business 
elites. It also explores gender differences of opinion leaders on Weibo.  
The media agendas  
 
The study selected ten media outlets on Weibo, including five official media 
outlets and five commercial media outlets. The selected media outlets are the top ten on 
the Weibo list of the most influential media outlets, which is the only official ranking of 
media influence on Weibo. The ranking is calculated by analytical hierarchy process and 
weight average method, considering a variety of factors. These factors include a user’s 
total number of original daily posts, its total number of daily posts, its total number of 
posts within seven days, the total times a user’s posts have been read by the audience 
within seven days, the average times a post of the user has been read within seven days, 
its total number of followers, its total number of retweets within seven days, its total 
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number of comments received within seven days, its total number of daily @, its total 
number of private letters received from the audience every day, and its total number of 
replies to the audience every day (more details can be found on Weibo.com). The 
calculation weighs almost all the possible influential factors of a user’s activity on 
Weibo. Therefore, the Weibo ranking of the most influential media based on this 
calculation is an appropriate source for this study. The five official media outlets selected 
for this study include People’s Daily, The Global Times, China Daily, CCTV News, and 
Xinhua News, while the five commercial media outlets selected for this study include 
Southern Metropolis Daily, The Beijing News, China Newsweek, Phoenix Weekly, and 
Caixin News. (See Appendix A for more details.) 
The agendas of opinion leaders  
 
The dissertation also selected the top ten influential media professionals, 
celebrities, scholars, and business elites on Weibo. In order to explore gender differences 
of the opinion leaders on Weibo, the study selected the top ten influential male opinion 
leaders and the top ten influential female opinion leaders. The selection of these opinion 
leaders was mainly based on the official report of Weibo opinion leaders by the public 
opinion research lab at Fudan University, which has been discussed in the literature 
review. Because the list was compiled five years ago, the dissertation also used two other 
sources, which are the only other available rankings of Weibo opinion leaders, to verify 
the timeliness and validity of the list. The other sources include Weibo’s official monthly 
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report of the most influential users and a monthly report of top 100 influential opinion 
leaders on Weibo, which is compiled jointly by the website of Global Times and a 
commercial big data platform in China (www. gsdata.cn). The dissertation relied on 
Fudan University’s report of Weibo opinion leaders because the report is independent 
from either Weibo or the government. It is a result of academic research. However, 
Weibo’s official report is a self-summary while Global Times is an official newspaper of 
the government. The comparison among the three sources indicates that the majority of 
the official report by the public opinion research lab at Fudan University is still valid by 
the time of data collection. There are four journalists on the list who had quit the service 
before the time of data collection, including Chengpeng Li, Chenggang Rui, Yi Ding, and 
Xijin Hu. Scholar Zhuzi Fang, businessman Jinyong Yu, and two female opinion leaders, 
including Xingyu Lu and Yu Liu, had also quit the service before the time of data 
collection. Therefore, these people were replaced by users of the same kind with similar 
rank orders on the other two lists. Weibo’s official report was referred first while the 
monthly report by Global Times was used only when Weibo’s official report did not have 
an appropriate substitute. The top ten influential celebrities were selected based on 
Weibo’s official report of influential users because the other two sources don’t have the 
ranking of celebrities. (See Appendix A for more details.) 
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Data collection  
 
The microblog posts employed in this study were collected through the open API 
(Application Program Inter-face) under Weibo’s license. Because of the large amount of 
data on Weibo, this study only retrieved the original text microblogs posted by the 
selected media outlets and opinion leaders in only one month in 2015. Therefore, re-
posted microblog posts and posts with only multimedia content were not included. March 
was selected for this study because the National People's Congress Conference (Mar 5, 
2015 to Mar 15, 2015) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Mar 
3, 2015 to Mar 13, 2015) were held in this month. The two political conferences are 
called the “two sessions” (liang hui) in China. The National People’s Congress 
Conference (NPC) provides an opportunity for the state officers to review past policies 
and present future development plans. The Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) is where the representatives of various social groups voice their 
opinions on social and political issues. The “two-sessions” lasted half a month and 
covered a wide spectrum of social and political issues, which in turn generated diverse 
discussions of different issues on Weibo. The study therefore assumed that there were 
more discussions of social and political issues on Weibo in March than the other months 
in 2015. This should result in data collected in March 2015 having less irrelevant 
information, such as self-promotion posts and daily accounts of personal thoughts on 
social media platforms. Meanwhile, the data also included microblogs posted after the 
“two-sessions” (March 15-March 31), which rendered the data to be representative of 
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Weibo posts during and after the conferences. In total, 14,299 microblogs were collected 
for this study, among which 6,812 were from official media outlets, 3,530 from 
commercial media outlets, 1,141 from media professionals, 256 from celebrities, 876 
from scholars, 529 from business elites, 601 from male opinion leaders, and 554 from 
female opinion leaders.  
Content analysis  
 
The unit of analysis is each microblog post of the selected media outlets and 
opinion leaders. Each post was coded for source of the post, topic of the post, and 
publishing date of the post. Source of the post was coded as (1) official media, (2) 
commercial media, (3) media professionals, (4) celebrities, (5) scholars, and (6) business 
elites. Based on the issue categories used in previous agenda-setting studies in China (e.g. 
Zhang, Li, & Li, 2001; Luo, 2014; Peng, 2014), the author reviewed 10% of all the data 
collected and decided to code the data into the following categories: (1) politics, (2) 
military, (3) economics, (4) law/order, (5) environment, (6) society/income/housing, (7) 
education/job, (8) health/food safety, (9) culture/religion, (10) technology/Internet, (11) 
international affairs, and (0) others. The category “others” was excluded in the analysis. 
(See Appendix B for a comprehensive list of issue categories in the codebook.) 
The coding process was conducted by two journalism majors who are fluent in 
both Chinese and English. The author decided to manually code all the data because 
semantic analysis of Chinese characters cannot be successfully conducted by the 
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computer. Although there are several software packages that can perform the analysis, 
their results are less satisfactory. In order to achieve higher intercoder reliability, the 
coders went through a training session before the coding process. First, the coders coded 
20 samples of each group of the opinion leaders (160 posts in total) together to clarify 
and revise the definitions of the categories. Each coder was then given another 160 posts 
to code for pretesting. After the training sessions, the coders separated the work and 
coded the samples independently. To calculate the intercoder reliability, the author 
randomly selected 10% of the sample for each coder to analyze. Both coders used the 
same codebook and coded the samples individually. Scott’s pi (Scott, 1995) was used to 
compute the intercoder reliability in this study. Scott’s pi value can range from 0 (no 
agreement) to 1 (perfect agreement), with 0.75 or above indicating an acceptable 
intercoder reliability (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Among the three variables coded for 
this study, the coders achieved 100% agreement on source of the post and publishing date 
of the posts. The Scott’s pi value for the topic of the posts is 0.89, which is above the 
minimum requirement.  
Based on source of the post and the rank order of topic frequency, the study 
constructed the issue agendas of the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo to 
answer RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4. The rank order of 11 issues on the codebook 
(excluding the “other” category) was compiled for both the media outlets and opinion 
leaders. Spearman’s rank-order correlation, a statistical test to measure the strength of 
55 
 
association between two sets of rankings, was computed for the correlation analyses 
proposed in H1 and H2.   
Granger causality analysis  
 
The core of this study is to test who leads the discussion on Weibo or whose 
agenda influences the others, which is described in RQ5. The study applied Granger 
causality tests in EViews—a statistical software used mainly in time-series analysis—to 
determine the directional correlations among the issue agendas of the media outlets and 
opinion leaders. The “VAR” function in EViews was employed to test the multivariate 
Granger causality among the agendas of the media outlets and opinion leaders. The 
results are presented as Chi-square values and p values. Granger causality tests are 
frequently used in economics to test whether the trend in one variable precedes the trends 
in others. A number of studies have used Granger causality tests to determine causal 
correlations in agenda-setting studies (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1990; Meraz, 2011; Peng, 
2014; Neuman et al., 2014; Soroka, 2002; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008). 
Granger causality analysis provides more accurate results than cross-lagged analysis 
because it not only predicts the direction of the agenda-setting process but also calculates 
the time span needed to generate linkages among different agendas for a specific study 
(Meraz, 2011; Peng, 2014; Neuman et al., 2014).  
Based on Granger’s (1969) notion, variable Y can “Granger cause” variable X if a 
study can predict X better with the past values of Y than when it is excluded (Granger, 
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1969; Freeman, 1983). For example, if the study assumes that the media coverage on 
environmental issues could “Granger cause” the scholars’ discussion about 
environmental issues on Weibo, it will first test how well the scholars’ discussion about 
environment issues on a certain day can be predicted by their discussion of the same issue 
in previous days. It will further test how well the scholars’ discussion about 
environmental issues on a certain day can be predicted by the media coverage on the 
same issue in previous days. If the latter is more significant than the former, the study is 
able to conclude that the media agenda of environmental issues Granger causes the 
scholars’ agenda of the same issue, which in turn indicates that the media set the agenda 
for the scholars on environmental issues. Before applying Granger causality tests, it’s 
important to make sure that the time series used in the study is stationary, or the means 
and variance of the data are all constant over time. The time series used in this study are 
percentages that range from 0 to 1, which indicates that its mean and variance stay about 
the same over the length of the series. Therefore, the data in this study is stationary and 
proper to be used in Granger causality tests.  
Time span is important to determine the direction of the agenda-setting effect 
between two agendas. Compared to the public agenda decades ago, the current public 
agenda is more volatile because of the extensive influence of new media. It takes 
traditional media several weeks to months to set the public’s agenda (McCombs, 2004), 
while the agenda-setting effects on the Internet can take place as fast as in a week or less. 
Roberts, Wanta, and Dzwo (2002) found that the time lag between traditional news and 
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online discussion varied from one to seven days, with the seventh day producing the most 
effect. Neuman et al. (2014) used Granger causality analysis and found that the best time 
lag for their agenda-setting study about social media was seven days. Therefore, this 
study used Granger causality analysis to first determine the proper time lag for this study 
and then to explore agenda-setting effects between the media and opinion leaders on 
Weibo. The AIC and BIC values—criteria commonly applied for lag selection in Granger 
causality tests—indicated that three days is the best time lag for this study (Becketti, 
2013). 
THE COMPARATIVE AGENDA-SETTING STUDY 
 
The comparative agenda-setting study explores whether the agenda-setting effects 
on Weibo differ in crisis and non-crisis news. This study selected two cases from the 
trending topics on Weibo in 2015 for further examination, including the 2015 Tianjin 
explosion and the news of Tu Youyou winning the Nobel Prize for medicine. The Tianjin 
Explosion represents crisis news and the case of Tu Youyou represents non-crisis news.  
The Tianjin explosion 
 
A chemical warehouse at the port of Tianjin, China, exploded 12 August, 2015. 
Three huge explosions coupled with a series of small ones killed more than a hundred 
and injured hundreds of others (Tatlow, 2015). The large casualty and huge economic 
loss that resulted from the explosion have made it China’s worst industrial disaster for 
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years (The Guardian, 2015). News of the incident was first broken by Chinese netizens 
on Weibo and suddenly became a national sensation within two hours (Weibo Report, 
2015b). More than a hundred trending topics regarding this incident emerged on Weibo 
and the most popular one is #Tianjin Tanggu Explosion#, which has been read by 
Chinese netizens over 7,500 million times (Weibo Report, 2015b). Shortly after the 
explosion happened, local media, national media, local governments, as well as various 
kinds of opinion leaders participated in the discussions of the incident on Weibo, 
focusing on different aspects of the issue and trying to help the city of Tianjin. Based on 
the above discussion, the Tianjin explosion provides an ideal example of crisis situation 
for this study. 
Tu Youyou’s case  
 
Tu Youyou, an 84-year-old scientist with little fame in China, won the Nobel 
Prize for medicine in October 2015. Tu won the award because she discovered the 
malaria drug artemisinin, which is “humankind's best defense against the mosquito-borne 
disease, which kills 450,000 people each year” (Hunt & Lu, 2015). Tu is the first Chinese 
Nobel laureate in medicine and the first Chinese citizen to receive the Nobel Prize in 
natural sciences. When receiving the award, she attributed her success to Chinese 
traditional medicine because she found the drug artemisinin from ancient Chinese 
medicine manuscripts. The news generated a heated debate on Weibo for mainly two 
reasons. First, Tu’s role in discovering artemisinin has been ignored by the whole country 
59 
 
for more than 40 years since she started her research in this field in the 1970s. In the past 
few years, she applied several times for Academician of Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS), the highest level of national honor for Chinese scientists, but was rejected. People 
questioned why Tu’s efforts had not been honored by the government and whether the 
selection criteria for the members of CAS were fair. Second, this news escalated the 
already fierce debate about whether Chinese traditional medicine is better than Western 
medicine. Tu Youyou’s case had nothing to do with any crisis, but was such a 
sensationalized event on Weibo that is worth analyzing. It provides a good example for 
this study to explore the agenda-setting effects in non-crisis circumstance. 
Data Collection 
 
The Tianjin explosion generated tens of thousands of Weibo posts and various 
trending topics. To make the sample size manageable, this study only focused on the 
microblog posts under the most popular trending topic #Tianjin Tanggu Explosion#, as 
discussed previously. A preliminary review of these microblog posts revealed that a large 
number of the posts appeared on Weibo within two weeks after the explosion (August 12, 
2015). Therefore, the study retrieved all the posts that included #Tianjin Tanggu 
Explosion# and were published between Aug 12, 2015 and Aug 31, 2015. Tu Youyou’s 
case received much less media and public attention compared to the Tianjin explosion; 
and it resulted in fewer Weibo microblog posts. The discussion about Tu Youyou’s case 
on Weibo lasted from October to December; the nomination came out on Oct 5, 2015 
60 
 
while the ceremony took place on Dec 10, 2015. As a result, this study retrieved all posts 
that included “Tu Youyou” and were published between Oct 5, 2015 and Dec 31, 2015.   
Because the purpose of this study is to explore agenda-setting effects among the 
official media, the commercial media, and four kinds of opinion leaders on Weibo (media 
professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business elites), it only coded Weibo posts that 
were published originally by the media outlets and four kinds of opinion leaders for both 
cases. Re-posted microblog posts and posts with only multimedia content were not 
included. In general, 3,909 Weibo posts were manually coded for the Tianjin explosion, 
among which 753 were from the official media (19.3%), 1,405 from the commercial 
media (35.9%), 430 from media professionals (11%), 448 from celebrities (11.5%), 491 
from scholars (12.6%), and 382 from business elites (9.8%). There were 972 Weibo posts 
for Tu Youyou’s case, among which 192 were from the official media (19.8%), 293 from 
the commercial media (30.1%), 133 from media professionals (13.7%), 71 from 
celebrities (7.3%), 167 from scholars (17.2%), and 116 from business elites (11.9%).  
Content analysis  
 
The study used a content analysis to construct the agendas of the media and the 
opinion leaders on Weibo for both cases. The unit of analysis is each microblog post of 
the media outlets and opinion leaders. Each post was coded for source of the post, 
attribute of the case discussed in the post, and publishing date of the post. Source of the 
post was coded as (1) official media, (2) commercial media, (3) media professionals, (4) 
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celebrities, (5) scholars, and (6) business elites. While the discussions of both cases on 
Weibo mentioned different aspects of the issue, this study thus focused on the attribute 
agendas of the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo for both cases. Because the 
attributes of each case were unknown, the study applied an inductive approach. The same 
two coders in the previous study randomly selected 10% of the data for each case, 
analyzed the selected posts, and defined the attributes of the case in each post. Based on 
this preliminary examination, the frequently appearing categories were recorded and 
refined as the codebook for the content analysis of the entire data. As a result, the 
attributes of the Tianjin explosion include: (1) casualty, (2) economic loss, (3) pollution, 
(4) rescue, (5) damages, (6) accountability, (7) the cause, (8) firefighters, (9) social 
impact, (10) reconstruction, (11) the government, and (0) others. The attributes of Tu 
youyou’s case include: (1) sense of honor, (2) research achievement, (3) criticism of the 
system, (4) scientists, (5) Chinese medicine, (6) female scientists, and (0) others. The 
category “others” was excluded for both cases in the analysis. (See Appendix C for a 
comprehensive list of issue categories in the codebook.) 
As in the previous study, the coding process was conducted by two journalism 
majors, who are fluent in both Chinese and English. The coders went through a short 
training session before the coding process. To calculate the intercoder reliability, the 
author randomly selected 10% of the sample for each case. Both coders used the same 
codebook and coded the sub-sample individually. Among the three variables coded for 
this study, the coders achieved 100% agreement on source of the post and publishing date 
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of the posts. The Scott’s pi value for the attributes of the Tianjin explosion is 0.83, and 
the Scott’s pi value for the attributes of Tu youyou’s case is 0.87.  Both values are above 
the minimum requirement (0.75).  
Network analysis  
 
The study utilized the NAS model to compare the networked attribute agendas of 
the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo for both cases. Traditional agenda-setting 
studies compare the salience of one attribute at a time through simply counting its 
frequency. Differently, the NAS model is able to compare all the involved attributes of an 
issue at once by measuring the degree centrality and the correlations of the attributes 
within the attribute network of the issue. The core of the NAS model is network analysis, 
which is able to associate various attributes of an issue to form a comprehensive picture 
of the issue.  
To prepare the data for network analysis, the study first constructed the networked 
agenda for the official media, the commercial media, and four kinds of opinion leaders. 
The networked agendas illustrate how different entities link various attributes of an issue 
together. To operationalize the links of various attributes of each issue, attributes that 
were mentioned on the same day were considered implicitly linked. The decision was 
made because it is rare for a single post to mention two attributes because of its 140-
character limit (Vargo et al., 2014). Therefore, the number of times any two attributes 
were mentioned by a given source on the same day was calculated to measure the pair of 
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issues’ strength of association. The data was then converted to network matrices for each 
group involved.  
The study used UCINET software to analyze the networked agendas of the media 
and opinion leaders. Degree centrality of each networked agenda was calculated by the 
function of centrality and the power. Quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) was used to 
test the correlations of these networked attribute agendas, which in turn reveals the 
differences and relationships among these networks, and therefore, answers RQ6, RQ7, 
RQ8, and RQ9. In network analysis, degree centrality refers to the number of ties that a 
node has in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Applying this concept to the current 
study, it means the number of connections an attribute has with other attributes in the 
network of an issue. The more connections an attribute has with other attributes, the more 
central it is in the network. The higher degree centrality of an attribute signifies the 
greater importance of the attribute in the network. Degree centrality in network analysis 
explains the similarities and differences between two networked agendas, while QAP 
correlations reveal the interrelationships among these agendas. 
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Chapter Five: Results of the Intermedia Agenda-Setting Study 
 
This chapter presents the results of the intermedia agenda-setting study in this 
dissertation. First, it displays the issue agendas of the selected media outlets and opinion 
leaders, describes the issues emphasized in each agenda, and compares the differences 
and similarities. Second, it shows the correlations among these agendas by using 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation. It then reveals the causal relationships among these 
agendas by using Granger causality tests and finally draws a conclusion of the agenda-
setting effects between the media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo.   
ISSUE AGENDAS OF OPINION LEADERS ON WEIBO 
 
RQ1 explores the issue agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo, including media 
professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business elites. Table 1 shows the Weibo agendas 
of different opinion leaders, represented by the frequency and rank order of the issues. 
The top five issues on media professionals’ agenda include politics, the environment, 
health/food safety, law/order, and the economy. About one-fifth of media professionals’ 
posts discussed the issue of politics (19.9%). The environment and health/food received 
equal attention from media professionals and accounted for 13.6% of all the posts by 
media professionals. The other issues that media professionals discussed more frequently 
than others on Weibo included law/order (10.5%) and the economy (9.6%).  
The top five issues on celebrities’ agenda include the environment (11.3%), 
society/income/housing (7%), health/food safety (5.9%), politics (3.5%), and law/order 
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(3.5%). The issue agenda of celebrities on Weibo was different from all the studied 
agendas because the topic range on celebrities’ agenda was not as wide as the other 
agendas. Celebrities devoted most attention to the environment (11.3%) while they 
ignored several issues including the economy, culture/religion, technology/Internet, and 
military. Social issues (7.0%) ranked second on the agenda of celebrities on Weibo, 
followed by health and food safety (5.9%). Celebrities posted political issues on Weibo 
(3.5%) the same frequency as the issues of law and order (3.5%), which were at the 
bottom of the top-five list of celebrities’ issue agenda. Although celebrities discussed 
political issues on Weibo as well, they gave less attention to political issues compared to 
media professionals.  
 
 Table 1. Percentages and Rankings of the Issues of the Opinion Leaders  
 
Media 
Professionals 
(%/Rank) 
Celebrities 
(%/Rank) 
Scholars 
(%/Rank) 
Business Elites 
(%/Rank) 
Politics 19.9(1) 3.5 (4.5) 18.2 (1) 12.5(2) 
Environment 13.6(2.5) 11.3 (1) 12.8 (3) 18.5 (1) 
Health/Food Safety 13.6(2.5) 5.9(3) 7.8 (6) 2.1 (8) 
Law/Order 10.5(4) 3.5 (4.5) 17.0 (2) 3.6 (7) 
Economy 9.6(5) 0(8.25) 8.2 (4) 7.4 (4) 
Society/Income/Housing 
/Housing 
8.5(6) 7.0 (2) 8.1 (5) 10.6 (3) 
Education/Jobs 6.0(7) 0.8 (7) 7.6 (7) 4.9 (6) 
International Affairs 2.2(8) 2.7(6) 1.4 (9) 1.3(9) 
Culture/Religion 1.4(9.5) 0 (8.25) 2.5 (8) 0.6 (10.5) 
Military 1.4(9.5) 0 (8.25) 0.6 (11) 0.6 (10.5) 
Technology/Internet  1.3(11) 0 (8.25) 0.9 (10) 5.7 (5) 
N(Posts) 1141 256 876 529 
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On scholars’ agenda, politics was the predominant issue, accounting for 18.2% of 
all the posts by scholars on Weibo. This is similar to media professionals who also posted 
more political issues than the others on Weibo. The second frequently discussed issue on 
scholars’ agenda is law/order (17%), followed by the environment (12.8%), economy 
(8.2%), and society/income/housing (8.1%). The top five issues on business elites’ 
agenda include the environment (18.5%), politics (12.5%), society/income/housing 
(10.6%), economy (7.4%), and technology/Internet (5.7%). Both celebrities and business 
elites were most concerned about environmental issues. Business elites differed from the 
other opinion leaders on Weibo because they posted more about technology and the 
Internet, a topic that other groups barely mentioned. 
In sum, there are some notable similarities and differences among the issue 
agendas of these opinion leaders. Politics and the environment were the predominant 
issues that appeared on the agendas of all kinds of opinion leaders. Politics ranked first on 
both media professionals’ and scholars’ agendas on Weibo, while the environment ranked 
first on the agendas of celebrities and business elites. The economy was among the top 
issues on the agendas of all groups except for celebrities, who did not publish a single 
post about the economy during the time studied. Issues of law and order were among the 
top concerns on the agendas of all groups except for business elites, while social issues 
were among the top concerns on the agendas of all groups but media professionals. 
Although health and food safety were among the top five issues on the agendas of all 
groups but scholars, it ranked right behind the sixth on scholars’ Weibo agenda. 
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The least important issues on the agendas of all groups included military, 
culture/religion, and international affairs. Business elites stood out as the one that paid 
significantly more attention to the issues of technology and the Internet, a topic that 
received little attention from the other groups. Finally, although celebrities shared four of 
the five top issues on the agendas of media professionals and scholars, they paid attention 
to fewer kinds of issues, without posting anything about military, the economy, 
culture/religion, and technology/Internet.  
CORRELATIONS OF THE OPINION LEADERS’ AGENDAS ON WEIBO 
 
RQ2 investigated the interrelationships among the issue agendas of media 
professionals, celebrities, scholars, and business elites on Weibo. Table 2 shows the 
correlations among these agendas, with the significant correlations highlighted. There 
was a significantly high correlation between the agendas of media professionals and 
scholars (r=.89, p<.01), despite some differences discussed above. The issue agenda of 
media professionals was significantly correlated with that of celebrities as well (r=.76, 
p<.01). In addition, the correlation coefficient between the agendas of media 
professionals and scholars was much higher than that between the agendas of media 
professionals and celebrities, indicating that the agendas of media professionals and 
scholars had more in common than the other two agendas. Moreover, the issue agenda of 
scholars was also correlated with that of business elites, although at a lower significance 
level (r=.68, p<.05). The significance indicates that scholars and business elites have 
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similar issues on their Weibo agendas, while the lower significance level can be 
explained by the fact that business elites frequently discussed technology and the Internet 
in their Weibo posts, but scholars paid little attention to that topic. Finally, there was no 
significant correlation between the agendas of media professionals and business elites 
(r=.58, p=.06). Although both the agendas of celebrities and scholars were correlated 
with that of media professionals, the issue agenda of celebrities was not significantly 
correlated with that of scholars (r=.59, p=.05). The weakest correlation was shown 
between the agendas of celebrities and business elites (r=.49, p=.13), indicating that the 
two agendas were divergent and had little in common.  
 
Table 2. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Agendas of the Opinion Leaders  
 Media Professionals 
 
Celebrities 
 
Scholars 
 
Business Elites 
 
Media Professionals  .76** .89** .58 
Celebrities   .59 .49 
Scholars    .68* 
Business Elites     
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
GENDER DIFFERENCES OF OPINION LEADERS ON WEIBO 
 
RQ3 explores the similarities and differences between the issue agendas of male 
and female opinion leaders on Weibo. Table 3 contains the frequency and rank order of 
the issues on both agendas. The table shows that the most predominant issue for male 
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opinion leaders was health/food safety, which accounted for more than one fifth of the 
posts from this group (20.8%). The issues of environment (15.6%) and politics (13.5%) 
followed as the second and the third most salient issues on the agenda of male opinion 
leaders on Weibo. Male opinion leaders were concerned about society/income/housing 
(8.5%) and law/order (7.8%) as well, which ranked fourth and fifth on their issue agenda 
on Weibo.  
The top five issues on the agenda of female opinion leaders were the environment 
(15.5%), politics (13.4%), society/income/housing (6.7%), law/order (5.8%), and 
education/jobs (4.0%). Female opinion leaders on Weibo discussed environmental and 
political issues much more frequently than the others. They were concerned about social 
issues and law/order as well, which were also frequently discussed across all studied 
groups. Female opinion leaders stood out as the only ones that paid significant attention 
to education and jobs.  
Overall, the issues agendas of male and female opinion leaders were quite similar 
in that they shared four of the five top issues, including the environment, politics, 
society/income/housing, and law/order. These issues were also among the most salient 
issues on the agendas of celebrities, scholars, and business elites. The differences 
between the two agendas were obvious as well. Male opinion leaders dedicated their 
attention to food safety issues while female opinion leaders discussed environmental 
issues most frequently on Weibo. In addition, female opinion leaders were more 
concerned about education and jobs than male opinion leaders.  
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Table 3. Percentages and Rankings of the Issues of Male/Female Opinion Leaders and the 
Media  
 
Male  
Opinion Leaders 
(%/Rank) 
Female  
Opinion Leaders 
(%/Rank) 
Official 
Media 
(%/Rank) 
Commercial 
Media 
(%/Rank) 
Health/Food Safety 20.8(1) 2.5 (9) 4.2 (8) 4.8(8) 
Environment 15.6(2) 15.5 (1) 4.4 (7) 5.9 (6) 
Politics 13.5(3) 13.4(2) 21.7 (1) 20.2 (1) 
Society/Income/Housing 8.5(4) 6.7 (3) 6.4 (2) 12.3 (2) 
Law/Order 7.8(5) 5.8(4) 5.5 (5) 7.7 (4) 
Economy 
/Housing 
5.3(6) 3.2 (6.5) 5.7 (4) 9.8 (3) 
Education/Jobs 4.5(7) 4.0 (5) 4.6 (6) 5.0 (7) 
Technology/Internet 2.2(8) 2.9(8) 3.5 (9) 3.9(9) 
International Affairs 1.3(9) 3.2 (6.5) 6.0 (3) 6.9 (5) 
Culture/Religion 0.5(10.5) 1.8 (10) 2.3 (10) 1.5 (11) 
Military  0.5(10.5) 0.4(11) 2.1 (11) 1.8 (10) 
N(Posts) 601 554 6812 3530 
 
 
H1, which posited that the issue agendas of male and female opinion leaders on 
Weibo do not correlate with each other, was not supported; in fact, the issue agenda of 
male opinion leaders on Weibo was significantly correlated with that of female opinion 
leaders (r=.64, p<.05) (See Table 4).  
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Table 4. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Issues of Male/Female Opinion Leaders and 
the Media  
 Male  
Opinion Leaders 
 
Female  
Opinion Leaders 
 
Official 
Media 
 
Commercial 
Media 
 Male Opinion Leaders  .64* .43 .54 
Female Opinion Leaders   .72* .77** 
Official Media    .96** 
Commercial Media     
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEDIA AGENDAS ON WEIBO 
 
RQ3 explores the similarities and differences between the issue agendas of 
official and commercial media outlets on Weibo. Table 3 shows that both types of media 
outlets had the same issues as the top five salient issues on their agendas, including 
politics, society/income/housing, the economy, law/order, and international affairs. The 
only difference was the rank order of these issues on both agendas. Political issues 
dominated the official media agenda (21.7%) and the commercial media agenda (20.2%), 
while social issues ranked second on both the official media agenda (6.4%) and the 
commercial media agenda (12.3%).  Official media outlets paid more attention to 
international affairs (6.0%), which ranked third on the official media agenda and was 
followed by economic issues (5.7%) and law/order (5.5%). For the commercial media, 
the third most salient issue was economic issues (9.8%), followed by the issues of 
law/order (7.7%) and international affairs (6.9%). It’s notable that health/ food safety, 
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one of the most popular issues on the agendas of the opinion leaders, was not among the 
most salient issues on both kinds of media agendas. However, the official and 
commercial media outlets paid much more attention to international affairs than all kinds 
of opinion leaders. Official media outlets focused excessively on political issues 
compared to the other issues, indicating their role as the government’s mouthpiece to 
publicize government policies and report on government officials. Both kinds of media 
outlets paid more attention to international affairs than the opinion leaders, which can be 
understood by their journalistic role of informing the public.  
H2, which posited that the official and commercial media agendas are not 
correlated, was not supported. The agendas of official and commercial media were highly 
and significantly correlated (r=.96, p<.01) (See Table 4).  
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ISSUE AGENDAS OF THE MEDIA AND OPINION LEADERS ON 
WEIBO 
 
H3, which posited that the official media agenda is not correlated with the issue 
agendas of the opinion leaders, including media professionals, celebrities, scholars, and 
business elites, was partially supported. As Table 5 shows, the official media agenda was 
not correlated with the issue agendas of all kinds of opinion leaders but scholars (r=.64, 
p<.05), indicating that most opinion leaders on Weibo do not follow news of official 
media outlets on Weibo. H4, which posited that the commercial media agenda is 
correlated with the issue agendas of the opinion leaders, was partially supported as well. 
The commercial media agenda was correlated with the issue agendas of all kinds of 
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opinion leaders except for celebrities, suggesting that all kinds of opinion leaders but 
celebrities were concerned about similar issues as the commercial media on Weibo.  
Table 5. Spearman’s rho Correlations for the Agendas of the Media and Opinion Leaders  
 Official 
Media 
 
Commercial 
Media 
 
Media 
Professional
s 
 
Celebrities 
 
Scholars Business 
Elites 
Official Media  .96** .54 .40 .64* .57 
Commercial 
Media 
  .64* .44 .76** .68* 
Media 
Professionals 
   .76** .89** .58 
Celebrities     .60 .48 
Scholars      .68* 
Business Elites       
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
Specifically, the commercial media agenda was correlated with that of media 
professionals (r=.64, p<.05). There was a slightly stronger correlation between the issue 
agendas of commercial media outlets and business elites (r=.68, p<.05). The strongest 
correlation was found between the issue agendas of commercial media outlets and 
scholars (r=.76, p<.01).   
AGENDA SETTING BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND OPINION LEADERS ON WEIBO 
 
RQ5 explored the agenda-setting effects between the issue agendas of the media 
outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo. Table 6 contains the Granger causality results for 
these agendas. The results show that agenda-setting effects between the media outlets and 
opinion leaders on Weibo appeared in six of the 11 topics studied, including politics, 
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law/order, the environment, social issues, education/jobs, and health/food safety. 
Specifically, official media outlets only set the agenda of commercial media outlets in 
politics (χ²=8.99, p<.05). They did not Granger cause any opinion leaders in the 
discussions of all the issues. Instead, the official media agenda was strongly influenced 
by celebrities on the issue of law and order (χ²=20.32, p<.01). Moreover, media 
professionals (χ²=23.10, p<.01), celebrities (χ²=18.96, p<.01), and business elites 
(χ²=18.52, p<.01) significantly Granger caused the official media agenda on the issue of 
environment. The results indicate that the official media’s agenda-setting role barely 
exists in China.   
 
Table 6. Granger Causality Results for the Media and Opinion Leaders  
Issue Category 
          Causality Direction 
χ² 
From To 
Politics 
Business Elites           Celebrities 16.25** 
Media Professionals       Celebrities 21.68** 
Business Elites           Commercial Media 8.29* 
Official Media  Commercial Media 8.99* 
Law/Order 
Celebrities  Official Media 20.32** 
Celebrities Scholars 9.84* 
Commercial Media  Scholars 9.17* 
Commercial Media Celebrities 3.55* 
Environment 
Scholars  Media Professionals  11.80** 
Scholars  Celebrities   8.89* 
Media Professionals Celebrities 17.80** 
Media Professionals Commercial Media 8.39* 
Media Professionals Official media 23.10** 
Celebrities Commercial Media 9.16* 
Celebrities Official Media 18.96** 
Business Elites           Official Media 18.52** 
Commercial Media Official Media 19.11** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Social Issues Commercial Media Scholars 10.99* 
Education/Jobs 
Business Elites Media Professionals 8.70* 
Business Elites Scholars 7.05* 
Health/Food Safety 
Business Elites Media Professionals 21.83** 
Celebrities Media Professionals 13.80** 
Commercial Media Media Professionals 12.48** 
  Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
Commercial media outlets Granger caused the attentions of official media outlets 
and opinion leaders to four of the six issues. Specifically, the commercial media set the 
agenda of law and order for celebrities (χ²=3.55, p<.05), who in turn set the agenda for 
both the official media outlets (χ²=20.32, p<.01) and scholars (χ²=9.84, p<.05). 
Commercial media outlets also Granger caused the attention of official media outlets to 
environmental issues (χ²=19.11, p<.01), and scholars to social issues (χ²=10.99, p<.05). 
Additionally, commercial media outlets greatly influenced media professionals’ agenda 
of health and food safety (χ²=12.48, p<.01). The results suggest the commercial media set 
the issue agenda of law and order for both the official media and other opinion leaders. 
Commercial media outlets also played a significant agenda-setting role on social issues as 
well as health and food safety. However, they had little impact on political issues.  
Media professionals greatly influenced the agendas of the official media 
(χ²=23.10, p<.01) and the commercial media (χ²=8.39, p<.05) on environmental issues. 
Similarly, celebrities Granger caused the discussion of environmental issues by 
commercial media outlets (χ²=9.16, p<.05) and official media outlets (χ²=18.96, p<.01). 
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Celebrities also strongly influenced the official media agenda on law and order (χ²=20.32, 
p<.01). However, both media professionals and celebrities were more like the 
intermediaries in the communication process on Weibo. Their agendas were set by other 
opinion leaders overall. For example, scholars strongly Granger caused higher attention 
of media professionals and celebrities to environmental issues. Moreover, business elites 
(χ²=21.83, p<.01), celebrities (χ²=13.80, p<.01), and the commercial media (χ²=12.48, 
p<.01) altogether set the agenda of media professionals on health and food safety.   
Scholars’ agenda-setting role was only evident on the issue of environment. 
Scholars Granger caused higher attention of media professionals (χ²=11.80, p<.01) to 
environmental issues. Media professionals in turn Granger caused higher attention of 
celebrities (χ²=8.89, p<.05), and they both set the agenda of environmental issues for the 
official and commercial media. Therefore, scholars were the most influential opinion 
leader on environmental issues and they set the agenda of environmental issues for the 
media outlets and other opinion leaders. 
Business elites influenced the agendas of the media and other opinion leaders on 
four of the six issues. Business elites set the agendas of celebrities (χ²=16.25, p<.01) and 
the commercial media (χ²=8.29, p<.05) on political issues. They also set the agenda of the 
official media on environmental issues (χ²=18.52, p<.01), and media professionals on the 
issue of health and food safety (χ²=21.83, p<.01). Business elites’ agenda-setting role is 
quite evident on the issue of education and jobs. They Granger caused higher attention of 
both journalists (χ²=8.70, p<.05) and scholars (χ²=7.50, p<.05) to the issues of education 
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and jobs. Overall, business elites were the most influential opinion leader in this study. 
They set the agenda of the media outlets on political and environmental issues, and they 
led the discussions of other opinion leaders on the issues of education, employment, 
health, and food safety.  
CONCLUSION OF THE INTERMEDIA AGENDA-SETTING STUDY 
 
The intermedia agenda-setting study in this dissertation displays the issue agendas 
of the media outlets and four different opinion leaders on Weibo, discovers the 
interrelationships of these agendas, and finally reveals the directional causal relationships 
or the agenda-setting effects among the agendas of the media outlets and opinion leaders 
on Weibo. The major findings of this study include: 
First, the issue agendas of the media outlets differed from the issue agendas of the 
opinion leaders on Weibo. The most salient issues on the opinion leaders’ Weibo agendas 
were political and environmental issues, while the most predominant issues on the 
agendas of the official and commercial media outlets were political and social issues. 
Although the media outlets and opinion leaders were both concerned more about politics 
than other issues, they focused on different aspects of the issue topic. Official media 
outlets mainly posted political information about government decisions and activities, 
policy reports, government documents, as well as appointment/dismissal of Party 
officials, which is consistent with their official role of publicizing news of the 
government to the Chinese people. Differently, the opinion leaders devoted their Weibo 
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posts to political information that evaluates government performance, reveals the 
misconduct of government officials, and criticizes the incompetence and corruption of the 
government. They kept a critical attitude in the discussion of politics rather than believing 
in the official reports. It is the different views of the opinion leaders on Weibo that 
contribute to a deliberative public sphere on Chinese social media platforms. Commercial 
media outlets stayed somewhere between the two extremes, leaning more toward the 
official media. This can be confirmed by one of the surprising findings of this study, 
which shows that the official and commercial media agendas were highly, significantly 
correlated with each other. The commercial media agenda shared more similarity with the 
official media agenda on politics possibly because they received most political news from 
the same source—the government. However, commercial media outlets are less 
controlled than official media outlets so that they were able to include some critical and 
investigative reporting of politics on their agenda.  
Second, commercial media outlets and business elites influenced the agendas of 
other opinion leaders on a variety of social issues, while official media outlets failed to 
set the agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo. It’s not surprising that no agenda-setting 
effects were found between the official media and opinion leaders on Weibo. The result 
is consistent with the previous finding that people had little faith in highly manipulated 
media outlets in China (Zhang, 2006). Instead, agenda-setting effects between 
commercial media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo signify the popularity and 
credibility of the commercial media in China. The result not only confirms that agenda 
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setting functions in a free media environment (McCombs, 2004), but it also reflects the 
changing media environment in China. Unlike the official media outlets that are fully 
controlled by the government, commercial media outlets establish a journalistic image as 
being independent and investigative. This image was approved by the opinion leaders in 
this study because they followed the commercial media agenda in various issues, 
including social disputes and legal issues, social security, income distribution, housing 
problems, health, and food safety. Although commercial media outlets were able to 
influence the opinion leaders on social issues, it is notable that official media outlets still 
set the commercial media agenda on political issues. The finding demonstrates that 
political issues are sensitive topics strictly controlled by the government. Commercial 
media outlets may have more autonomy in reporting a variety of issues. However, they 
lose the freedom and have to follow the official media when it comes to politics. 
Business elites also strongly influenced other opinion leaders in the discussions of 
political, social, and educational issues on Weibo. Business elites even set the 
commercial media agenda on political and environmental issues. The results confirm the 
previous finding that business elites were the typical opinion leader in China (Su, Zhang, 
& Zhang, 2009). It is possibly because business elites have strong influence in the policy 
decision-making process in China (Zhu, 2012).  Some of them were once government 
officials while others have gradually gained political influence through long-term 
business operations (Zhu, 2012). Therefore, business elites are able to influence 
government policy outcomes through their personal networks with politicians or through 
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their money. Zhu (2012) argued that the Chinese political decision-making process, once 
manipulated only by political elites, is gradually becoming a participatory one joined by 
business elites. In addition, the rapid economic development in China leads to a booming 
capital market and the fever in starting up businesses. Therefore, it is understandable that 
wealthy business elites are the toast of Chinese society, especially for people who intend 
to make a fortune in this business boom.   
Third, the news agenda on Weibo was fragmented in that the opinion leaders 
emphasized different issues in their Weibo posts. Moreover, the relationships among the 
agendas of the studied groups were diverse and interactive overall, indicating a dynamic 
agenda-setting effect on social media platforms. Regarding the fragmented agenda on 
Weibo, media professionals discussed more about political issues but paid less attention 
to social issues in their Weibo posts. Celebrities discussed much fewer issues than the 
other opinion leaders and they did not post about the economy at all. Scholars devoted 
most of their Weibo posts to political and legal issues, and they did not pay enough 
attention to health and food safety. Business elites were the only ones who paid 
significant attention to the issues of technology and the Internet, which can be possibly 
understood as their professional need to keep abreast with the present state of science and 
technology.  
As far as the diverse agenda-setting effect is concerned, scholars and journalists 
were the most influential opinion leaders in discussing environmental issues on Weibo, 
although commercial media outlets and business elites set the agendas of other issues. For 
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example, Jing Chai, an independent, investigative female journalist who used to work for 
CCTV, produced a self-financed documentary film—Under the Dome—and released it 
on the Internet in late February, 2015. The film presented her year-long investigation of 
air pollution in China and openly questioned state-owned energy companies, steel and 
coal factories, as well as the ability of the Ministry of Environmental Protection to act 
against the big polluters. The film quickly became popular on the Internet and evoked 
fierce discussion about environmental protection in China. Not unexpectedly, the film 
was banned and removed from the Internet within a week.  However, the impact of the 
film on this society will last longer, which is manifested by the findings of this study that 
environmental issues were one of the most prominent issues for all kinds of opinion 
leaders throughout March 2015. The case presented a good example of journalists setting 
the agendas of air pollution on Weibo, forcing the media and others to pay attention to 
the issue in China.  
In addition, interactive agenda-setting effects were found among these groups. For 
example, commercial media outlets set the agenda of scholars on social issues, while 
scholars set the commercial media agenda on environmental issues. Media professionals 
set the agenda of celebrities on political issues, while celebrities influenced the agenda of 
media professionals on the issues of food and safety. The results reflect that the news 
agenda on social media platforms is diverse and different individuals share what they 
perceive as important, leading to the collective intelligence in online public sphere 
(Kwak, Park, & Moon, 2010; Tapscott & Williams, 2006). 
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Finally, this study found strong correlations between the agendas of male and 
female opinion leaders on Weibo, indicating there are no significant gender differences of 
opinion leaders on Weibo. The finding is surprising because gender disparities are 
prevalent in both Western society and media industry (e.g. Armstrong & Gao, 2011; 
Cullity & Younger, 2009). A possible explanation might be that the gender gap in China 
has narrowed to a great extent as women’s social status keeps improving. As discussed in 
the literature, women outnumber men in Chinese journalism industry and colleges. The 
number of Chinese female entrepreneurs grows fast as well. The increasing number of 
women in the journalism industry, academic world, and business field could probably 
contribute to fewer gender differences of the opinion leaders in corresponding fields. It is 
also notable that women who ascend to the level of opinion leaders are different from 
women in the average population. Hegemony theory suggests that society tends to 
reinforce the existing power structure as a means of ensuring continuation of the status 
quo—masculinity and patriarchy. As a result, women have to assimilate attributes of 
masculinity and act like a man in order to gain the power of opinion leadership. 
Therefore, the lack of gender differences in opinion leadership is possibly resulted from 
women opinion leaders gradually internalizing attributes that reinforce existing power 
structure, which obviously favors masculinity.  
In sum, this study showed that agenda-setting effects exist only between the 
commercial media and opinion leaders on Weibo. The results verified the basic 
assumption of this dissertation that the agenda-setting effect on social media platforms is 
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a diversified and dynamic process where the media outlets and opinion leaders interact 
with each other and lead the discussion of the topic that they believe to be important. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the fragmented agenda and dynamic agenda-setting 
process on social media platforms when examining the agenda-setting theory in future.  
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Chapter Six: Results of the Comparative Agenda-Setting Study 
 
This chapter presents the results of the study which compared agenda-setting 
effects in crisis and non-crisis news. The Tianjin explosion and Tu Youyou’s case were 
chosen as appropriated cases of crisis and non-crisis news. For each case, this chapter 
first displays the networked attribute agendas of the selected media outlets and opinion 
leaders, describes the attributes emphasized in each networked agenda, and compares the 
differences and similarities among these agendas. It then shows the correlations among 
these networked agendas by using QAP correlation analysis. The correlations among 
these networked agendas show agenda-setting effects between the media outlets and 
opinion leaders. Finally, it compares the interrelationships of the networked agendas in 
both cases and discovers patterns of the relationships between the media outlets and 
opinion leaders during these crisis and non-crisis news.  
THE AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS IN CRISIS NEWS 
 
RQ6 explores the networked attribute agendas of the media outlets and opinion 
leaders in crisis news. The study examined the case of Tianjin explosion to answer this 
research question. The Tianjin explosion was first posted by Chinese netizens on Weibo. 
Official media outlets did not report the news until they were able to send reporters to the 
field hours later. Their coverage of the incident relied heavily on official reports and 
failed to investigate the behind-the-scenes stories, which was possibly related to 
misconduct of the local government in Tianjin. 
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Table 7. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Official and Commercial 
Media in the Tianjin Explosion 
 Official Media 
(DC/Rank) 
Commercial Media 
(DC/Rank) 
Casualty 104 (1) 131 (1) 
Rescue 87 (2) 92 (9) 
Pollution 86 (3) 115 (4) 
Social Impact 81 (4.5) 130 (2) 
Accountability 81 (4.5) 122 (3) 
Reconstruction 78 (6) 109 (6) 
Firefighters 70 (7) 112 (5) 
The Cause 66 (8) 70 (11) 
Damages 61 (9) 94 (8) 
Economic Loss 55 (10) 102 (7) 
The Government 53 (11) 71 (10) 
 
 
 
Table 7 displays the degree centrality of each attribute on the networked attribute 
agendas of the official and commercial media outlets. Degree centrality refers to the 
number of links an attribute has with the other attributes in the network. The attribute that 
has higher degree centrality is more central and salient in the network than the others. 
The table shows that casualty of the explosion was the most central attribute of Tianjin 
explosion for both the official media (n=104) and the commercial media (n=131), 
indicating that both kinds of media outlets cared most about casualties in the explosion. 
Rescue operations (n=87) and the pollution caused by the explosion (n=86) ranked 
second and third on the networked agenda of the official media, while the second most 
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central attribute on the networked agenda of the commercial media was the explosion’s 
social impact (n=130), followed by accountability (n=122), meaning who should be held 
accountable for the explosion. The differences indicate that official media outlets focused 
on the incident itself while commercial media outlets tended to investigate the stories 
behind the scenes.   
Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the networked attribute agendas of the official and 
commercial media through visual graphics. The node size was adjusted to match the 
degree centrality of each attribute. The bigger a node, the greater degree centrality the 
node has. The visual display of each networked agenda clearly shows which attribute is 
located at the center of the network and which attribute is peripheral. The visualization 
software Netdraw was used to create these figures (Borgatii, 2002).  
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Figure 1. Official Media Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
 
Figure 2. Commercial Media Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
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Table 8 displays the degree centrality of each attribute in the networked attribute 
agendas of different opinion leaders. The top three central attributes on the networked 
agenda of media professionals included the government (n=89), accountability (n=77), 
and casualty (n=75). The attribute “the government” mainly refers to criticism toward 
both central and local governments in terms of controlling the media, withholding the 
truth, and acting irresponsibly in the crisis. The results indicate that media professionals 
not only made efforts to uncover the truth behind the explosion, but they were also 
angered by the corruption and incompetence of both central and local governments 
involved in this explosion. The networked agenda of business elites was similar to that of 
media professionals, with the government being the most central attribute on the network 
agenda (n=66), followed by casualty (n=59) and accountability (n=58). The top two 
central attributes on the networked agenda of scholars were the government (n=94) and 
accountability (n=89), which is the same as media professionals. Scholars also devoted 
their Weibo posts to discussions about the firefighters in the explosion (n=83), which was 
the third most central attribute on their networked agenda. Finally, celebrities cared most 
about who should be held accountable for this explosion. The attribute “accountability” 
(n=50) was the most central attribute on celebrities’ networked agenda, followed by the 
firefighters (n=48) and casualty (n=46). Figures 3-6 display the networked attribute 
agendas of different opinion leaders through visual graphics. 
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Table 8. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Opinion Leaders in the 
Tianjin Explosion 
 Media 
Professionals 
(DC/Rank) 
Celebrities 
(DC/Rank) 
Scholars 
(DC/Rank) 
Business 
Elites 
(DC/Rank) 
The Government 89(1) 46(4) 94(1) 66(1) 
Accountability 77(2) 50(1) 89(2) 58(3) 
Casualty 75(3.5) 46(3) 66(6) 59(2) 
Social Impact 75(3.5) 32(5.5) 83(3.5) 53(5) 
Pollution 68(5) 30(7) 79(5) 52(6) 
Firefighters 67(6) 48(2) 83(3.5) 56(4) 
The Cause 54(7) 20(8) 53(8) 41(7.5) 
Rescue 51(8) 32(5.5) 47(9) 41(7.5) 
Damages 38(9) 0(10.5) 58 (7) 28(10) 
Reconstruction 35(10) 0(10.5) 26(10.5) 20(11) 
Economic Loss 33(11) 14(9) 26(10.5) 30(9) 
 
 
In sum, official media outlets merely reported facts and numbers of the explosion 
in their Weibo posts, including the death toll, number of injuries, rescue operations, the 
pollution caused by the explosion, and other social impact resulted from the disaster. In 
fact, information about the explosion reported by official media outlets was highly 
censored by the government. Although commercial media outlets paid much attention to 
these attributes as well, they differed from official media outlets by also tracing the 
accountability of the explosion and sometimes pressuring the government for the truth. 
The networked agendas of all kinds of opinion leaders presented a quite different picture 
from the agendas of the media outlets. The opinion leaders tended to discuss more about 
the slow reaction of the local government to the explosion, the corruption of both local 
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and central governments involved in this case, the mishandlings of the crisis by the local 
government, and the innocent firefighters who were sacrificed in the explosion.  
Figure 3. Media Professionals’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
 
Figure 4. Celebrities’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
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Looking back at the case of the Tianjin explosion, there are two things that made 
this explosion even more disastrous. First, the local government neither responded to the 
explosion immediately nor acted properly to the crisis. Before determining the nature of 
the explosives, local government officials sent groups of firefighters into the explosion 
without proper equipment and skills. The first group of firefighters was all killed by the 
subsequent explosions that occurred right after they entered the area. The following 
groups suffered heavy casualties because the firefighters were not trained or prepared for 
a large-scale chemical fire. They sprayed water into the fire, which actually caused 
several secondary explosions. Second, local government officials remained silent until 
they held the first press conference 17 hours after the explosion. Within the five days 
after the explosion, the local government held six press conferences with low-ranking, 
uninformed municipal officials who infuriated both the central government and the media 
outlets. It is because these officials did not know anything about the explosion and failed 
to provide valuable information. When no real information came from the press 
conferences, rumors circulated on the Internet, which incurred the central government’s 
crackdown on the Internet two days after the explosion. Official media outlets were only 
reporting facts filtered by the government on Weibo. Conversely, the opinion leaders’ 
criticism of the government and quest for the truth struck home with citizens.     
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Figure 5. Scholars’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
 
 
Figure 6. Business Elites’ Network in the Tianjin Explosion 
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RQ7 investigates the correlations between the networked attribute agendas of the 
media outlets and opinion leaders in crisis news. As shown in Table 9, none of the 
networked agendas of the opinion leaders were correlated with the media agendas. The 
result confirms the previous finding that the networked agendas of the opinion leaders are 
different from the networked media agendas. The networked agenda of the commercial 
media was significantly correlated with that of the official media in the Tianjin explosion 
(r = +.64, p<.01). Although government censorship kicked in almost immediately after 
the explosion, it faced strong challenge from both the media and the public. Even official 
media outlets questioned the misconduct of local officials several times. However, the 
findings of this study reveal that commercial media outlets tended to deviate from the 
official discourse but their attempts were ultimately fruitless in the face of the 
government’s media blockage. 
Table 9. QAP Correlations between the Networked Agendas of the Media and Opinion 
leaders in the Tianjin Explosion 
 Official 
Media 
Commercial 
Media 
 
Media 
Professionals 
 
Celebrities 
 
Scholars Business 
Elites 
Official Media  .64** .21 .26 .08 .21 
Commercial 
Media 
  .18 .22 .14 .16 
Media 
Professionals 
   .81** .87** .89** 
Celebrities     .73** .87** 
Scholars      .84* 
Business Elites       
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
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It is notable that the networked agenda of media professionals was highly, 
significantly correlated with that of celebrities (r = +.81, p<.01), scholars (r = +.87, 
p<.01), and business elites (r = +.89, p<.01). Moreover, the networked agenda of business 
elites was highly, significantly correlated with that of celebrities (r = +.87, p<.01) and 
scholars (r = +.84, p<.01). Finally, the networked agenda of celebrities was also 
correlated with that of scholars (r = +.73, p<.01). The results show that the networked 
agendas of all kinds of opinion leaders were highly inter-correlated among each other, 
indicating great similarities among these agendas. In addition, the highest correlation 
value appeared between the agendas of media professionals and business elites, which 
were highly correlated with the other agendas. Therefore, media professionals and 
business elites were the most influential opinion leaders in the news of this crisis.  
THE AGENDA-SETTING EFFECTS IN NON-CRISIS NEWS 
 
RQ8 explores the networked attribute agendas of the media outlets and opinion 
leaders in a non-crisis news situation. This study examined the case of Tu Youyou and 
found six major attributes of the case that appeared in the Weibo posts studied. The first 
attribute was “sense of honor,” which refers to the fact that Tu is the first Chinese citizen 
to receive the Nobel Prize in natural sciences and the award brought about strong national 
pride among the Chinese people. The second attribute was “research achievement,” 
referring to Weibo users’ positive attitude toward the achievement of Chinese scientific 
research. After Tu won the Nobel Prize, many people believed that Chinese scientific 
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research overall has made great progress and deserves public praise. “Criticism of the 
system” refers to Weibo users’ criticism of the bureaucracy within Chinese academic 
institutions. Since Tu Youyou’s application to the members of CAS was rejected several 
times, the public discussed on Weibo about whether the promotion mechanism in 
Chinese academic institutions was fair and impartial. “Scientists” refers to the discussions 
about the little public attention given to scientists compared to celebrities in China. The 
fifth attribute was “Chinese medicine,” referring to the discussions that involved the 
comparison between Chinese traditional medicine and Western medicine. As discussed 
before, Tu Youyou attributed her success to Chinese traditional medicine, which 
generated a heated debate about whether Chinese traditional medicine is better than 
Western medicine. The last attribute was “female scientists,” which refers to the 
discussions about the achievements and qualifications of Chinese female scientists. 
Because Tu Youyou is a female scientist, her achievement gave rise to more public 
attention to female scientists in China.  
Table 10. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Networked Agendas of Official and 
Commercial Media in Tu Youyou’s Case  
 Official Media 
(DC/Rank) 
Commercial Media 
(DC/Rank) 
Chinese Medicine 27(1) 49(1) 
Sense of Honor 26(2) 43(2) 
Scientists 20(3) 38(5.5) 
Female Scientists 14(4) 41 (3.5) 
Research Achievement 11(5) 38(5.5) 
Criticism of the System 10(6) 41(3.5) 
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Table 10 displays the degree centrality of each attribute on the networked attribute 
agendas of the official and commercial media. As it shows, Chinese medicine was the 
most central attribute on the networked agendas of both the official media (n=27) and 
commercial media (n=49), indicating that both kinds of media outlets more often 
discussed the comparison between traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine. 
Sense of honor ranked second on the networked agendas of both the official media 
(n=26) and commercial media (n=43). The top two central attributes on the networked 
agendas of the official and commercial media were the same, indicating that both kinds 
of media outlets paid more attention to the same attributes of Tu Youyou’s case than the 
others. Scientists (n=20) ranked third on the networked agenda of the official media. 
Differently, commercial media outlets paid more attention to criticism of the system 
(n=41) and female scientists (41), which tied for the third place on the agenda of the 
commercial media. Despite the top two issues, the networked agenda of the official 
media in the case of Tu Youyou differs from that of the commercial media. Commercial 
media outlets dedicated more posts to criticizing the bureaucracy in Chinese academic 
institutions while official media outlets discussed more about public attitude toward 
scientists. Figures 7-8 display the networked attribute agendas of the media outlets 
through visual graphics. 
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Figure 7. Official Media Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
 
 
Figure 8. Commercial Media Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
 
98 
 
Table 11 displays the degree centrality of each attribute on the networked attribute 
agendas of the opinion leaders. It shows that media professionals (n=22), scholars (n=25), 
and business elites (n=18) all paid more attention to the criticism of the system than the 
others, indicating that most of their Weibo posts were criticizing the unfair promotion 
system in Chinese academic institutions. The second most central attribute on the 
networked agenda of media professionals was female scientists (n=21), followed by sense 
of honor (n=19) and scientists (n=19). Differently, the attributes of research achievement 
(n=5) and Chinese medicine (n=5) tied for the second place on the networked agenda of 
celebrities. The second most central attribute on the networked agenda of scholars was 
sense of honor (n=23), followed by scientists (n=21) and Chinese medicine (n=21). The 
second most central attribute on the networked agenda of scholars was scientists (n=17), 
followed by sense of honor (n=12).  
 
Table 11. Degree Centrality (DC) for the Attribute Agendas of Opinion Leaders in Tu 
Youyou’s Case 
 
Media 
Professionals 
(DC/Rank) 
Celebrities 
(DC/Rank) 
Scholars 
(DC/Rank) 
Business 
Elites 
(DC/Rank) 
Criticism of the System 22(1) 7(4) 25(1) 18(1) 
Female Scientists 21(2) 8(2.5) 17(5) 11(4) 
Sense of Honor 19(3.5) 8(2.5) 23(2) 12(3) 
Scientists 19(3.5) 9(1) 21(3.5) 17(2) 
Research Achievement 15(5) 5(5.5) 9(6) 8(5.5) 
Chinese Medicine 14(6) 5(5.5) 21(3.5) 8(5.5) 
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The results show that both the media outlets and opinion leaders expressed their 
sense of honor when discussing Tu Youyou’s case on Weibo. Most of the Weibo posts 
mentioned that Tu is the first Chinese Nobel laureate in medicine, which is considered a 
point of national pride by the people. However, the media outlets discussed more about 
Chinese traditional medicine in their Weibo posts, while opinion leaders on Weibo 
devoted their posts to criticizing the bureaucracy in Chinese academic institutions. 
Figures 9-12 display the networked attribute agendas of different opinion leaders through 
visual graphics. 
Figure 9. Media Professionals’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
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Figure 10. Celebrities’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
 
Figure 11. Scholars’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
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Figure 12. Business Elites’ Network in Tu Youyou’s Case 
 
 
 
RQ9 investigated the correlations among the networked attribute agendas of the 
media outlets and opinion leaders in this non-crisis news event. Table 12 contains the 
QAP correlation matrix for Tu Youyou’s case. As it shows, none of the networked 
agendas of the opinion leaders were correlated with the media agendas, indicating that the 
media outlets and opinion leaders on Weibo presented quite different networked attribute 
agendas in this non-crisis news event. The networked attribute agendas of the official and 
commercial media were not correlated in Tu Youyou’s case, indicating that they had 
different attribute agendas. The significant correlations only appeared among the 
networked agendas of the opinion leaders. The networked attribute agenda of media 
professionals was significantly correlated with that of celebrities (r = +.70, p<.05).  
Moreover, the networked attribute agenda of business elites was significantly correlated 
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with that of media professionals (r = +.59, p<.05), celebrities (r = +.64, p<.05), and 
scholars (r = +.59, p<.05). The results suggest that, in Tu Youyou’s case, none of the 
opinion leaders followed the media coverage on Weibo. Instead, they discussed the case 
from different aspects and a critical approach. Additionally, media professionals, 
celebrities, and scholars presented different networked agendas in this case. However, 
their networked agendas all significantly correlated with that of business elites, 
suggesting that business elites are the most influential opinion leaders in Tu Youyou’s 
case.  
 
Table 12. QAP Correlations between the Networked Agendas of the Media and Opinion 
leaders in Tu Youyou’s Case 
 Official 
Media 
 
Commercial 
Media 
 
Media 
Professionals 
 
Celebrities 
 
Scholars Business 
Elites 
Official Media  .51 -.38 -.06 .32 -.33 
Commercial 
Media 
  -.25 -.05 .32 -.18 
Media 
Professionals 
   .70* .36 .59* 
Celebrities     .41 .64* 
Scholars      .59* 
Business Elites       
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
CONCLUSION OF THE COMPARATIVE AGENDA-SETTING STUDY 
 
The comparative agenda-setting study in this dissertation examined the crisis news 
of the Tianjin explosion and the non-crisis news of Tu Youyou to explore the networked 
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attribute agendas of the media outlets and different opinion leaders on Weibo, investigate 
the correlations of these agendas, and compare the differences of agenda-setting effects 
between the media outlets and opinion leaders in both cases. Both the Tianjin explosion 
and Tu Youyou’s case were an overnight sensation in China. Differently, media blockage 
played a role in the Tianjin explosion but not in Tu Youyou’s case. Tianjin’s explosion 
was caused by hazardous materials improperly or illegally stored in a warehouse that was 
covered up by the local government. The media’s further investigation of the case would 
reveal a corrupt system and the misconduct of government officials, both of which are 
politically sensitive issues in China. Therefore, local government remained silent 
throughout the process and the state enforced a media blockage shortly after the 
explosion. However, Tu Youyou’s Nobel Prize award is honorable and praiseworthy. 
Many posted on Weibo that the award was also a glorious international debut of Chinese 
traditional medicine, which generated national pride among the people. As a result, the 
public discourse for this case was free and autonomous. Comparing the two cases, the 
study discovered the following: 
First, the media agendas and the agendas of the opinion leaders on Weibo differed 
significantly in both crisis and non-crisis news. In the Tianjin explosion, the media 
outlets on Weibo focused on the death toll and rescue operations. Moreover, official 
media outlets frequently shifted their attention from reporting the explosion to dispelling 
rumors. Because no real news came out from official channels, rumors about the death 
toll and the cause of the explosion circulated on the Internet. Official media outlets kept 
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squelching rumors and updating the official death toll, which was highly censored by the 
state. Their attempts made things even more chaotic since few people tended to believe in 
the official data.  
Some of the commercial media outlets, such as Caixin News, made a foray into the 
investigation and spared no effort to uncover the background of the illegal warehouse. 
Most of the time commercial media outlets followed the news of official media outlets 
because of the government control. Independent investigation of the crisis on the Internet 
was banned and non-official information was removed immediately. The government’s 
media control seems to have come up short in front of the opinion leaders. They mainly 
posted about who should be responsible for this explosion and why local government 
remained silent. Although it was common that accounts were closed and posts were 
removed, opinion leaders on Weibo made great efforts to evade media control and 
question the authenticity of the official information.  
The discussion of Tu Youyou’s case centered around two aspects, including the 
debate about Chinese traditional medicine and criticism of the Chinese academic system. 
Both official and commercial media outlets discussed more about the former while all 
kinds of opinion leaders but celebrities focused on the latter. Obviously, the media outlets 
tended to seek this opportunity to advocate traditional culture and boost national pride. 
Very few posts of official media outlets criticized the Chinese academic system, which 
was the most peripheral attribute on their networked agenda. Commercial media outlets 
differed from official media outlets by sometimes criticizing the Chinese academic 
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system. Conversely, all kinds of opinion leaders except celebrities focused their attention 
on the bureaucracy within the Chinese academic system. They paid more attention to the 
social status of scientists in China as well and barely discussed Chinese traditional 
medicine. 
In sum, the official media’s role as the mouthpiece of the government is evident in 
both the crisis and non-crisis news events. Official media outlets strictly followed the 
party script and dedicated their efforts to maintaining social stability in time of crisis. 
When non-crisis news happened, they tended to promote national pride and traditional 
culture. It is not difficult to see the commercial media’s effort to diverge from the 
discourse of the official media in both cases. Commercial media outlets endeavored to 
disclose the truth in time of crisis, although under the pressure of government control. 
They included voices of both praise and criticism in their coverage of this non-crisis news 
event. However, their effort was pointless because of the media blockage in the crisis 
event, which was confirmed by the finding that the networked agendas of the official and 
commercial media outlets were significantly correlated in the Tianjin explosion. The 
commercial media presented a different agenda from the official media without 
government control, just as it did in the case of Tu Youyou.  The agendas of the opinion 
leaders changed in crisis and non-crisis news as well. On one hand, the agendas of the 
opinion leaders tended to be similar to each other when there was strong media control in 
the Tianjin explosion. On the other, their agendas were diverse and less correlated in non-
crisis news, when the public discourse was liberal and free in Tu Youyou’s case.  
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Moreover, no agenda-setting effects were found between the media outlets and 
opinion leaders on Weibo in both cases because they were not correlated at all. The result 
suggests that neither the official media nor the commercial media are able to set the 
agendas on Weibo when big news happens. It is easy to understand that none of the 
opinion leaders on Weibo followed the news of official media outlets in both cases. It is 
interesting that the networked agendas of the opinion leaders in both cases differed from 
the commercial media agenda. Although commercial media outlets have brought energy 
and vitality to journalism in China, it’s still difficult for them to reshape the stereotypical 
image of Chinese media that is deeply rooted in people’s mind. Additionally, commercial 
media outlets quickly lose their autonomy when crisis news happens and the media 
blockage kicks in. Therefore, they are unable to set the agendas for the opinion leaders on 
Weibo when big news happens.  
Finally, business elites were the most influential opinion leaders in both these 
crisis and non-crisis news situations on Weibo. Some scholars argue that media 
organizations and media-affiliated individuals are major information disseminators on 
Western social media platforms (e.g. Hu et al., 2012). However, the findings of this study 
show that business elites were the most influential Weibo users because almost all the 
other news agendas in both the crisis and non-crisis news events correlated with the 
agenda of business elites. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
Although traditional media (e.g. newspapers, radio stations, broadcast television, 
cables, etc.) are not dying as predicted by many, one cannot deny the fact that the rise of 
Internet-based social media shakes the journalism and communication field in an 
unprecedented way, changing journalism routines and news consumption habit, eroding 
traditional media’s market share, and most importantly, creating a globalized public 
sphere that is interactive and de-territorialized. The explosive growth of social media 
platforms has spurred heated discussion about the impact of social media use on 
traditional media industry (Pew, 2012), politics (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014; 
Parmelee & Bichard, 2011), popular culture (Cross, 2011), as well as social movement 
and activism (Gleason, 2013) in the Western world.  In authoritarian countries such as 
China, the discussions about social media use center around its impact on the country’s 
progress toward democracy, especially on freedom of the media and speech. Some 
argued that social media in China have created a new public sphere characterized by 
deliberative criticism for democracy (Reese & Dai, 2009). Others claimed that although 
progress has been made, there is still a political boundary around Chinese cyberspace and 
the democratic impact of social media on Chinese society still requires further 
observation (Jiang, 2014). By systematically examining agenda-setting effects between 
the media outlets and opinion leaders on Chinese Weibo, this dissertation opens up a 
window for the Western world to know about Chinese social media. Moreover, it verifies 
whether agenda setting exists between the media outlets and opinion leaders on Chinese 
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social media platforms and under what circumstances. Most importantly, this dissertation 
examined the agenda-setting effect from a different approach. As discussed in the 
literature, previous studies of the agenda-setting effect on social media platforms treated 
the social media agenda as a whole and compared it with traditional media agendas. This 
dissertation acknowledged the fragmented agendas within the social media world and 
examined the more nuanced agenda-setting effects among different influential groups on 
social media platforms. It is the first study that tested the agenda-setting effect from this 
approach and examined the opinion leaders and agenda setting in Chinese social media. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
This dissertation used both the traditional agenda-setting method and the 
networked analysis model to examine agenda-setting effects among different influential 
groups on Chinese Weibo. The results of the dissertation show that agenda-setting effects 
conditionally exist between the commercial media and opinion leaders on Weibo. The 
agenda-setting patterns among the opinion leaders were diversified and dynamic. The 
findings of this dissertation also reveal that business elites were the most influential 
Weibo users among all the studied opinion leaders.  
The first important finding is that commercial media outlets only set the agendas 
of opinion leaders on social and legal issues, including social security, housing, income 
disparities, food safety, as well as law and order. Conversely, the official media agenda 
was set by the opinion leaders on Weibo on various issues. Because agenda setting is 
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supposed to exist in a free media environment, the result suggests that Chinese 
commercial media presented a more liberal media discourse than the official media. 
Recent agenda-setting studies concluded that Chinese social media greatly influenced or 
set the agenda of the traditional media (e.g. (Bondes & Schucher, 2014; Fu & Chau, 
2014;  Tong & Zuo, 2014). However, previous studies did not consider the differences 
between the official and commercial media outlets. By differentiating traditional media 
agenda into the official and commercial agendas, this dissertation is able to locate where 
exactly the agenda-setting effect exists on Chinese social media platforms. The finding 
indicates the popularity of commercial media outlets in China as well. As discussed in the 
literature, commercial media outlets are widely recognized by Chinese people as being 
credible and professional. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand their agenda-setting 
role in daily discussions of social issues on Weibo. Further, unlike the official media who 
serve as political tools to advocate party ideologies and government policies, this 
dissertation found the commercial media paid more attention to social issues of concern 
to the people, possibly to attract more audiences and maximize profits.  
However, the agenda-setting role of the commercial media is weak and 
vulnerable. The results of the comparative agenda-setting study show that the commercial 
media lost their agenda-setting role in both the crisis and non-crisis events. It is possibly 
because the public’s distrust of the media outlets in China is so ingrained in people’s 
mind that they do not follow both the official and commercial media outlets when big 
news happens. Moreover, the media blockage is another reason why the commercial 
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media failed to set the agendas of the Tianjin explosion. Commercial media outlets 
presented a quite similar news agenda as the official media in the face of the media 
blockage because they both had to obey the government rules about what is acceptable to 
cover. However, the opinion leaders were able to post critical information of the crisis, 
which makes their agendas significantly different from the media agendas. It is notable 
that commercial media outlets questioned more about the accountability of the crisis than 
official media outlets, who merely reported facts and numbers. For example, Caixin 
News—one of the studied commercial media outlets—devoted the majority of its posts to 
the investigations of the illegal warehouse. The finding indicates that commercial media 
outlets endeavored to test the boundary of government control and provide independent 
and investigative reporting in the crisis. However, their efforts can be easily crushed by 
the government’s media blockage.  
The second major finding is that, compared to media professionals, celebrities, 
and scholars, business elites were the most influential Weibo opinion leader on a variety 
of issues, including political, social, and educational issues. Additionally, all the other 
opinion leaders’ agendas were significantly correlated with the agenda of business elites 
in both the Tianjin explosion and Tu Youyou’s case. Business elites also influenced both 
the official and commercial media agendas on environmental issues. They even set the 
commercial media agenda on politics. Business elites’ significant influence on Weibo can 
be explained by their networks with the government and the power of money over 
politics. 
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The finding of this dissertation showed a different opinion leadership on Chinese 
Weibo than Twitter. When reviewing the Western literature, the most frequently 
mentioned opinion leaders on Twitter include journalists and celebrities (e.g. Cha et al., 
2010; Dubois & Gaffney, 2014; Hu et al., 2012). However, journalists and celebrities are 
more like intermediaries in the communication process on Weibo. Although they were 
able to influence the agendas of other opinion leaders on certain issues, their agendas 
were set by others most of the time. Journalists failed to lead the discussion on Weibo 
possibly because of the government censorship, which results in their posts being 
frequently removed, or accounts closed. Some famous investigative journalists, such as 
Pengcheng Li, already quit the service in protest. 
As predicted, the results of this dissertation demonstrate that Weibo offers a 
critical viewpoint that the state-controlled media lack. The diversified public discourse on 
Weibo actually fosters democratic consciousness among the people, promotes cultural 
change from the bottom-up, and creates hope for more profound social and political 
reforms in China.  
Finally, the opinion leaders had diverse issue agendas, and the agenda-setting 
effects among these opinion leaders on Weibo were dynamic and complicated. 
Differences are obvious among the agendas of the opinion leaders. For example, 
celebrities did not post anything about the economy, military, and culture. Their agenda 
had less in common with the agendas of both the media outlets and other opinion leaders. 
Media professionals discussed more about political issues, scholars paid more attention to 
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political and legal issues, and business elites were more concerned about environmental 
issues. Further, business elites paid more attention to the issues of technology and the 
Internet than all the other groups. The results show that the news agenda on Weibo is 
fragmented, which is consistent with the argument that social media allow different 
voices, leading to the emergence of collective intelligence on social media platforms 
(Kwak et al., 2010; Tapscott & Williams, 2006). 
Agenda-setting effects among these opinion leaders are multidimensional and 
interactive.  For example, business elites set the agendas of media professionals and 
scholars on educational issues, while media professionals and scholars set the agenda of 
business elites on environmental issues. Similarly, celebrities set the agenda of media 
professionals on health and food safety, while media professionals set celebrities’ agenda 
on environmental issues. Furthermore, the agenda-setting process among these opinion 
leaders changed in different circumstances. The agendas of these opinion leaders were 
highly correlated with each other in the Tianjin explosion, while they were much less 
correlated in Tu Youyou’case. The findings demonstrate that the agenda-setting effect on 
social media platforms is not a linear process directly from one direction to another. It is 
a diversified and dynamic process where different parties interact and influence each 
other, and each party has the potential to set other agendas in certain issue topics. 
Therefore, future studies should be aware of the dynamic communication process and 
differentiate the fragmented agenda on social media platforms in order to get a clearer 
picture of the agenda-setting effect in the new media world.  
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LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
In order to map out the segmented agendas and the dynamic agenda-setting 
process on social media platforms, this dissertation included two types of media outlets 
and four kinds of opinion leaders discovered from previous studies. Additionally, the 
study conducted two studies using both the traditional agenda-setting method and the 
newly developed NAS model to test agenda-setting effects among these groups from an 
overall perspective and in specific cases. However, it’s not without limitations.  
The major drawback of this dissertation comes from its data source. Because of 
the government control in China, Weibo’s content is monitored and filtered all the time. 
Internet censorship is extremely harsh in times of crisis. For example, during the case of 
the Tianjin explosion, over 1,000 “rumor mongering” Weibo accounts were shut down 
for their reporting and commentaries of the case (Yu, 2015). Therefore, the data collected 
for the Tianjin explosion in this study are filtered and incomplete. However, this is an 
inevitable problem if future research studies Chinese social media. 
The first study of this dissertation only examined ten media outlets and ten 
opinion leaders of each kind. Future studies should include a larger sample of each source 
so that the results would reflect a more realistic agenda-setting process on Weibo. Also, 
the second study only examined two events representing crisis and non-crisis news. 
Future studies should include more cases and on different topics in order to rule out 
idiosyncratic issue characteristics.  
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Although Western scholars have found that gender disparities exist on social 
media platforms (e.g. Armstrong & Gao, 2011), this dissertation found no gender 
difference in opinion leadership on Weibo. Because this dissertation only studied opinion 
leaders on Weibo, the findings do not extrapolate to gender differences of ordinary 
Weibo users. Future studies should compare Weibo posts of ordinary men and women to 
explore the differences and the agenda-setting effects between them. It would also be 
worthwhile to compare gender differences on Western and Chinese social media 
platforms. Furthermore, this dissertation only compared some selected male and female 
opinion leaders to find gender differences.  Future research may get more accurate results 
by coding all sampled users based on their genders and compare the differences between 
the male and female groups. 
This dissertation found that business elites were the most influential opinion 
leader on Weibo, while studies of Western media found that journalists and celebrities 
tended to be the most influential ones on Twitter. The findings of this dissertation show 
the difference of opinion leadership on Weibo and Twitter. Actually, it was already 
discussed in the literature that Weibo and Twitter differ in several ways, although they 
share similar interface and functions. However, it was not the focus of this dissertation to 
compare Weibo and Twitter. A comparative study of either the agenda-setting process or 
other communication patterns between Weibo and Twitter may result in valuable 
findings. 
  
115 
 
Appendix A: List of Selected Weibo Users 
 
1. Official media: (1) People’s Daily, (2) The Global Times, (3) China Daily (4) 
CCTV News, (5) Xinhua News  
2. Commercial media: (1) Southern Metropolis Daily, (2) The Beijing News, (3) 
News China, (4) Phoenix Weekly, (5) Caixin News  
3. Top 10 media professionals: (1) Keqin Wang, (2) Jing Chai, (3) 
Wuyuesanren, (4) Guoping Lu, (5) Rose Lv, (6) Shusi Shi, (7) Fei Deng, (8) Jinling 
Yang, (9) Yongyuan Cui, (10) Shengjun Liu 
4. Top 10 celebrities: (1) Long Cheng, (2) Ge Hu, (3) Bingbing Fan, (4) Na Xie, 
(5) Kai Wang, (6) Chen Yao, (7) Wei Zhao, (8) Kun Chen, (9) Dongsheng Er, (10) Li 
Yuan 
5. Top 10 scholars: (1) Xianping Lang, (2) Jianrong Yu, (3) Bin He, (4) Daokui 
Li, (5) Qingdong Kong, (6) Ming Zhang, (7) Yushi Mao, (8) Nan Si-Ma, (9) Tan Ye, (10) 
Weifang He 
6. Top 10 business elites: (1) Shiyi Pan, (2) Jack Ma, (3) Zhiqiang Ren, (4) Kaifu 
Li, (5) Guangbiao Chen, (6) Lifen Wang, (7) Yonghao Luo, (8) Xiaoping Xu, (9) Huang 
Hong, (10) Shisan Ji 
7. Top 10 male opinion leaders: (1) Shiyi Pan, (2) Jack Ma, (3) Zhiqiang Ren, 
(4) Kaifu Li, (5) Xianping Lang, (6) Keqin Wang, (7) Xiaoping Xu, (8) Jianrong Yu, (9) 
Yongyuan Cui, (10) Daokui Li 
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8. Top 10 female opinion leaders: (1) Huang Hong, (2) Rose Lv, (3) Liuliu, (4) 
Yinhe Li, (5) Xin Zhang, (6) Hong Xu, (7) Jing Chai, (8) Lifen Wang, (9) Lan Yang, (10) 
Yihe Zhang 
INTRODUCTION TO OFFICIAL MEDIA OUTLETS 
 
People’s Daily started its publication in 1948 and is the official newspaper of the 
Chinese Communist Party. It is among the most influential and authoritative newspapers 
in China, published worldwide with a circulation of three million, according to its official 
website (www.en.people.cn).  
The Global Times started its publication in 1993 and is a daily Chinese newspaper 
under the auspices of the People's Daily newspaper. It is a national newspaper with a 
circulation of two million, according to its official website (www.globaltimes.cn). The 
newspaper not only competes with international media in the coverage of Chinese issues 
but also focuses on international issues at a Chinese perspective.  
China Daily is the leading English-language newspaper in China since its 
founding in 1981, with a total circulation of 900,000, according to its official website 
(www.chinadaily.com.cn). It encompasses in-depth reports to analyze affairs both in 
China and abroad. 
CCTV News is a 24-hour news channel of China Central Television (CCTV). 
CCTV news started its news broadcast in 2003. Its programs include newscasts, in-depth 
reports, and commentary programs, as well as feature presentations. CCTV—one of the 
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most important authoritative media in China—has about 340 million viewers in 171 
countries, according to its official website (www.english.cntv.cn).   
Xinhua News is one of the most influential and authoritative news websites in 
China (www.xinhuanet.com/english/). It is sponsored by Xinhua News Agency, the 
national news agency in China. Xinhua News provides news services for netizens in more 
than 200 countries, with a page view of more than 120 million. 
INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL MEDIA OUTLETS  
 
Southern Metropolis Daily started its publication in 1995 and is part of the giant 
Southern Media Group in China. The daily newspaper, headquartered in Guangzhou, is 
known for its investigative reporting and provocative commentary, which often gets it 
into trouble with the Beijing authorities. It has a circulation around 1.6 million, according 
to its official website (www.nfmedia.com). 
The Beijing News is a mainstream daily newspaper based in Beijing. It is co-
founded by Guangming Daily and Nanfang Daily Group, with a daily circulation of 
776,000. The newspaper started its publication in 2003 and is the first Chinese newspaper 
co-founded by media groups from different regions in China. It is also China’s first 
mainstream newspaper that adapts shareholding management system, according to its 
official website (www.bjnews.com.cn). 
Caixin News is the official news website of the Caixin Media Company, a 
Chinese media group that is dedicated to providing financial and business news and other 
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information through online content, periodicals, mobile apps, conferences, books and 
TV/video programs. The editorial staff at Caixin Media is well-known for independent 
thinking and professional practices. They are insiders with a profound understanding of 
China's economic and social transition, and they are highly valued by both journalists and 
the public for providing high-quality, credible news content (www.caixin.com). 
China Newsweek (News China in English) is one of the most influential news 
magazines in China. The weekly magazine, launched in 2000, is the product of China’s 
reform and opening up and is known for its investigative reporting and unique 
perspective. Based on market-oriented operation and management, the magazine is more 
liberal than many other media outlets in China and has a circulation of 100,000. It is the 
only Chinese magazine that is subscribed by the embassies of various countries in China 
(www.newschinamag.com).    
Phoenix Weekly is a weekly magazine launched by Phoenix Hong Kong Channel 
in 2000. Its content focuses on current events, politics, civil issues, and culture with 
international perspective and professional standard. It bridges the communication 
between mainland China and Hong Kong, Macau, as well as Taiwan. It is free of any 
political party, owned by independent shareholders, and striving for democracy, 
objectivity and fairness (www.ifengweekly.com). 
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Appendix B: Coding Instruction for the First Study 
 
1. Source of the Post 
(1) Official Media   (2) Commercial Media   (3) Media Professionals   (4) 
Celebrities   (5) Scholars   (6) Business Elites   (7) Male Opinion Leaders   (8) 
Female Opinion Leaders 
 
2. Publishing Date 
Example: 03/01/2015 
 
3. Topic of the Post 
(1) Politics/Policy: government conferences, policy report/document, political 
system construction, government performance, appointment or dismissal of Party 
officials, officials’ performance, officials’ misconduct, anti-corruption actions, 
election law, human rights, etc.    
(2) Military: national defense, military development, military conflicts with other 
countries, veterans, etc.   
(3) Economics: development in various industry sectors, financial policies, 
economic system reform, economic development plan, stock market, finance and 
investment, taxes, pension, aids for the elderly, retirement plan, interest rates, 
120 
 
state-owned enterprise reform, consumer spending, currency value and inflation, 
etc.    
(4) Law /Order:  laws, regulations, legal cases, legal system, judicial decisions, 
crime, social dispute, etc.   
(5) Environment: pollution, deforestation, energy conservation, climate change, 
air condition, environment protection, wildlife conservation, ecological 
construction, etc.    
(6) Society/Income distribution/Housing: mass disturbance/unrest, protests, 
stability maintenance, social problems, income and wealth gap, salary reform, 
national income distribution, housing price, real estate market, public housing, 
rental housing, forced demolition, demolition compensation, land expropriation, 
land dispute, residence relocation, etc.   
(7) Education/Job:  education plan, education spending, education system, 
education policy, education reform, education quality and equality, job market, 
employment/unemployment etc.   
(8) Health/Food Safety: healthcare reform, medical disputes, corruption of 
medical system, drug administration, food safety, food administration, genetically 
modified food, etc.    
(9) Culture/Religion: cultural programs/exhibitions, cultural exchange, traditional 
culture/festivals, religion, minority issues, etc.    
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(10) Technology/Internet: scientific development/innovation, science and 
technology talents, Internet development and regulation, E-commerce on the 
Internet, etc.    
(11) International Affairs: any information on foreign countries     
(0) Others 
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Appendix C: Coding Instruction for the Second Study 
1. Source of the Post 
(1) Official Media: state-owned newspapers, television stations, magazines, radio 
stations, websites, etc.    
(2) Commercial Media: semi-privatized newspapers, local television stations, 
commercial magazines, commercial websites, etc.    
(3) Media Professionals: journalists, hosts, anchors, officials and founders of 
media companies, media specialists and experts, etc.     
(4) Celebrities: famous individuals in entertainment, fashion, sports, and other 
cultural fields.     
(5) Scholars: experts in a specific field, professors in colleges and universities, 
etc.    
(6) Business elites: high-level officials (manager or above) in corporations and 
companies, business founders, etc. 
 
2. Publishing Date 
Example: 03/01/2015 
 
3. Attributes of Tianjin Explosion 
(1) Casualty: the death toll, injuries or any information related, stories about 
injured people, etc.    
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(2) Economic loss: the value of the damaged properties, personal economic loss, 
national economic loss, etc. 
(3) Pollution: any kind of pollution caused by the explosion and its social impact. 
(4) The Rescue: rescue operations by the government, NGOs, organizations, and 
individuals; skills, tips, and any other information related to the rescue operation. 
(5) Damages: damage compensation to the affected people by insurance 
companies, real estate companies, and the government; legal disputes involved in 
this process, etc. 
(6) Accountability: discussions about the individuals, companies, and government 
officials who were accountable for this explosion; investigations of the involved 
companies and individuals; etc. 
(7) The Cause: the cause of the explosion, the materials stored in the warehouse, 
the inspection of the materials, reports on the warehouse, etc. 
(8) Social Impact: aftermath of the explosion, donations, rumors on the Internet, 
Internet fraud, impacts on other cities in China, social activities regarding the 
explosion, etc. 
(9) Reconstruction: clearance of site, recovery actions, accommodation of the 
affected people, etc. 
(10) The Government: criticism of the local and central governments for 
withholding the truth, acting irresponsibly to the disaster, and controlling the 
media. 
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(0) Others 
 
4. Attributes of Tu Youyou’s Case 
(1) Sense of Honor: the honor of the award, national pride, people’s exciting 
feeling of the award, etc.    
(2) Research Achievement: development of Chinese scientific research; 
achievements of Chinese scientific research; positive attitudes toward Chinese 
scientific research, etc. 
(3) Criticism of the System: questions about why Tu Youyou’ was not elected as 
members of CAS; criticism of the promotion mechanism within Chinese 
academic institutions; criticism of the bureaucracy in Chinese academic 
institutions, etc. 
(4) Scientists: public attitudes toward scientists; social status of scientists; the 
comparison of social status between celebrities and scientists, etc. 
(5) Chinese Medicine: the comparison between traditional Chinese medicine and 
Western medicine; the debate about whether Chinese medicine is better than 
Western medicine or vice versa. 
(6) Female Scientists: social status of female scientists; achievements and 
qualifications of female scientists; social status of women, etc. 
(0) Others 
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